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Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) pose unique security challenges due
to the fact that their nodes operate in an unattended manner in potentially
hostile environments. A particularly difficult problem not addressed to date
is the handling of node capture by an adversary. A key goal for solving this
problem is that of limiting the damage caused by captured nodes. This is
important since node capture cannot be prevented: by definition, there is no
practical physical mechanism that could keep an adversary from physically ac-
cessing a sensor node discovered in an unattended area. Hence, the presence
of the adversary within a WSN must be detected, and of course, the earlier
the better. Adversary detection is predicated on the fact that access to a
captured node’s internal state, which includes secrets such as cryptographic
keys, incurs a nonzero time delay. This suggests that adversary detection be
divided into two phases: (i) in-capture detection, namely detection before the
adversary completes the capture process and gets a chance to access a node’s
internal state and do any network damage, and (ii) post-capture detection,
namely detection after the adversary already accessed and possibly used a
node’s internal state and secrets. Since the adversary is already active in the
network in the latter case, it is important to determine the overall network
resiliency; i.e., the ability of the network to operate in the presence of an
active adversary. In this work we focus on the former case in which we try
to identify the presence of the adversary prior to completion of a node capture.
To address the problem of in-capture adversary detection, we propose
two probabilistic schemes called the pairwise pinging scheme and quorum ping-
ing scheme, whereby the network continuously monitors itself in a distributed
and self-organizing manner. We investigate the trade-offs between the network
cost-performance and security of these schemes via a Markov Chain model, and
present analytical solutions which allow us to choose appropriate performance
parameters, such as the expected residual time-to-false-alarm, and security,
such as the probability of a missed detection. We show that the quorum
pinging is superior to pairwise pinging in terms of both cost-performance and
security. Furthermore, we will show that both schemes are scalable with net-
work size and their complexities are linearly proportional to the average node
degree of the network.
We also analyze the optimum strategy for an adversary to deploy its
agents over a sensor network; i.e., the strategy that enables the adversary to
achieve the maximum capture ratio with fixed number of agents. The order
of node capture, distribution, and location of agents are investigated and an
analytical model is provided that describes the optimum path for deploying
of agents to target nodes. Numerical data are presented to compare differ-
ent scenarios for deploying agents and the corresponding performance of each
deployment strategy. The proposed optimum strategy validates the physical
interpretation under practical scenarios and demonstrates the feasibility of our
capture strategy in practice. Finally, the resiliency of the underlying quorum
pinging scheme for detecting adversary agents is investigated despite collusion
among agents via optimum capture strategy.
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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of arrays of sensor nodes that are
battery powered, have limited computational capabilities and memory, and
rely on intermittent wireless communication via radio frequency and, possibly,
optical links. WSNs also include base stations, which have two primary func-
tions: (i) collection and caching of data received from sensor nodes and making
these data available for processing to application components of the network,
and (ii) monitoring the status and broadcast of simple control commands to
sensor nodes. Although in WSNs most nodes have limited, if any, mobility
after deployment, some nodes can be highly mobile (e.g., base stations placed
on humans, vehicles, aircraft). This implies that the array of sensor nodes may
need to implement dynamic routing functions that channel the sensed data to
the nearest base station.
WSNs have several characteristics that distinguish them from tradi-
tional wireless networks, namely: their scale is orders of magnitude larger
than that of typical wireless networks (e.g., tens of thousands as opposed to
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just tens of sensor nodes); they are extensible in the sense that they allow
the addition and deletion of sensor nodes after network deployment without
administrative intervention or physical contact by a human; and they may be
deployed in hostile areas where communication is monitored and sensor nodes
are subject to capture and manipulation by an adversary.
WSNs have received significant research attention due to their unique
characteristics, such as limited resource constraints and unreliable wireless
communication over an infrastructure-less network with ad-hoc connectivity.
WSNs are intended to provide services such as data acquisition, data aggre-
gation, and data routing. Their application spectrum covers various issues
such as environmental monitoring, structural health monitoring, surveillance,
seismic analysis, and tracking moving objects.
Goals. WSNs pose unique security challenges due to the fact that their
nodes operate in an unattended manner in potentially hostile environments.
A particularly difficult problem not addressed to date is the handling of node
capture by an adversary. A captured node can disclose all keying material
required for providing security services to the adversary. As a consequence all
security services in the network may be compromised. To date, most security
protocols fail to deal with this type of attack as they cannot distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate nodes having access to keying material [1, 2].
A key goal for handling such attacks is that of limiting the damage caused by
captured nodes, since node capture cannot be prevented. By definition, there
is no practical physical mechanism that could keep an adversary from physi-
cally accessing a sensor node discovered in an unattended area. Stajano’s big
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stick principle [3], which states that whoever has physical control of a device
is allowed to take it over, suggests that such an adversary is more powerful
than the Dolev-Yao [4] and traditional Byzantine adversaries [5], and hence
difficult to counter. Hence, the presence of the adversary within a WSN must
be detected, and of course, the earlier the better. However, the detection of
an adversary that does not attempt to access a node’s internal state and se-
crets but instead manipulates a sensor node’s inputs is less relevant to this
research. Redundant coverage of the sensed area with multiple nodes and
statistical analysis of correlated data can be used to detect the existence of
corrupt inputs [2, 6].
A desirable but unrealistic goal would be to prevent an adversary from
accessing a node’s internal state and secrets, and hence to prevent any dam-
age to network and application operations. Traditional mechanisms for ac-
complishing this include use of physical tamper-proof nodes and node shield-
ing. Current state-of-the-art technology used in protecting device secrets (e.g.,
cryptographic keys) via physical security mechanisms - which currently range
from those employed by smart cards (very little tamper resistant), to IBM’s
4758/64 crypto co-processors (highest FIPS 140-1 certified evaluation hard-
ware modules [7]), and to Physically Unclonable Functions [8, 9, 10](PUFs,
very good but not perfect physical security) - will continue to require network
security measures. That is, network security measures will continue to be nec-
essary for complementing physical device protection for the foreseeable future.
Previous research has already addressed the issue of the dependability
of the device’s physical protection by the network security measures. The re-
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sult was that most physical security measures were either unsuitable because
they were too weak (e.g., those employed by smart card technologies) or, if
they were strong, their form factor and power requirements made those devices
unsuitable for most MANET and sensor network applications (e.g., form fac-
tor and power requirements in the case of IBM 4758/64 crypto co-processors).
The form factor of such devices (e.g., size is at least double that of a sensor
node) can contribute to the discovery of a sensor placed in a hostile environ-
ment. Further, the use of such devices is prohibitively expensive (e.g., the cost
of IBM’s 4758 card used traditionally in banking applications is between three
and four order of magnitude higher than the cost of a typical sensor node).
Also, other technologies such as PUFs offer limited protection against crypto-
graphic attacks. Once PUF security is broken (e.g., secret key discovered with
a non-negligible probability) the PUF device becomes unusable, since the se-
cret key cannot be changed. Furthermore, recent data obfuscation techniques
[11, 12] provide resiliency against node capture to some extent by postponing
an adversary’s success in accessing the internal states of the target node.
Research Problems and Approaches. In our research, adversary detec-
tion is predicated on the fact that access to a captured node’s internal state,
which includes secrets such as cryptographic keys, incurs a nonzero time de-
lay. After discovering a sensor node location, the adversary must disassemble
that node in order to get access to its state and secrets. Hence, such access
is a time consuming procedure. The amount of time it takes for the adver-
sary to access a node’s internal state without inadvertently erasing most of it
is a non-deterministic variable which depends on the degree of physical node
protection, data obfuscation level, environmental conditions of the sensors’ in-
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stallation site, and the skill and technology level of the adversary. Regardless
of the nonzero amount of time it takes for an adversary to get to a captured
node’s internal state, that node would face some delay in its normal opera-
tion. This suggests that adversary detection be divided into two phases: (i)
in-capture detection, namely detection before the adversary gets a chance to
access a node’s internal state and do any network damage, and (ii) post-capture
detection, namely detection after the adversary has accessed and possibly used
a node’s internal state and secrets. Since the adversary is already active in the
network in the latter case, it is important to determine the overall network
resiliency; i.e., the ability of the network and its applications to operate in the
presence of an adversary.
Our research focuses on the in-capture detection phase and its impacts
on important applications in WSN such as message authentication and data
aggregation because they are basic to a WSN’s operation. The security of the
data aggregation process needs to be provided in the face of adversary attacks
such as false data injection and data corruption. To address the problem of
in-capture adversary detection, we propose two probabilistic schemes called
the pairwise pinging scheme and the quorum pinging scheme, whereby the
network continuously monitors itself in a distributed manner. Intuitively, ad-
versary detection can be achieved if the node absence from the network exceeds
the node monitoring period during which the node has to respond to neigh-
bors’ queries regarding its status. We investigate the trade-offs between the
network cost-performance and security of these schemes via a Markov Chain
model, and present an analytical solution which allows us to choose appropri-
ate performance parameters, such as the expected residual time-to-false-alarm
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and probability of false alarm; and security, such as the probability of a missed
detection. Performance evaluations of the proposed schemes over a wide range
of parameters will support our analytical results. We then generalize our pro-
posed model to the case in which the adversary can deploy multiple agents
in the WSN over various targets in a collaborative manner, i.e., as colluders.
The quorum pinging scheme is in charge of detecting the presence of adversary
agents presiding over target nodes. On the other hand from adversary’s per-
spective, the adversary’s objective is to maximize the number of successfully
captured nodes using its limited number of on hand agents. We investigate
the optimum strategies for an adversary in terms of the proper distribution
and order of deploying its agents in order to maximize its gain. Required
countermeasures to combat against the proposed optimal capture strategies
are presented as well.
Research Outline. In Section 1.1 of this work, we summarize the oper-
ational assumptions made and the definitions used. In Section 1.2, we present
the communications and adversary models used. In Chapter 2, we present a
brief overview of the proposed schemes addressing the captured node prob-
lem. Our goal is to point out the drawbacks of these approaches and identify
the properties of a potential solution which can be capable of countering the
captured node problem properly. It is worth mentioning that our proposed
methodology presented in the following chapters, is not directly related to any
of these previous approaches, rather we use these schemes in order to precisely
identify the required features that we plan to achieve. In Chapter 3, we present
the proposed pinging method to tackle the problem defined above, namely the
in-capture adversary detection. Following that, we introduce the two proposed
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schemes, namely the pairwise pinging scheme and the quorum pinging scheme
in details. Chapter 4 focuses on achieving optimal capture strategies for an
adversary with multiple agents engaged in a collusion. Finally, Chapter 5
concludes this research.
1.1 Operational Assumptions and Definitions
In WSN applications, we have to impose certain specifications into any pro-
posed mechanism which tries to address the captured node problem. The
nature of traffic is event driven which means that the observed data express-
ing the occurrence of the event of interest happens occasionally and are sensed
as redundant information by multiple nodes, mostly regardless of their locality.
The presence of an adversary requires node-to-node authentication guarantee-
ing secure communication against man-in-the-middle attacks across the net-
work terrain. Finally, resource constraints of battery powered nodes restrict
the usage of only lightweight cryptographic tools.
The architecture of WSN requires another set of properties as follows.
The design should be scalable as participating nodes can be incrementally
added or dropped from the network during the network lifetime. The ad-hoc
formation of the network imposes an infrastructure-less connectivity with no
central authority and no a priori knowledge of random neighbors. Any pro-
posed mechanism should be implemented in a distributed and self-organizing
manner which is capable of countering underlying unreliable wireless commu-
nication issues such as packet loss.
Assumption 1 The end-nodes and the aggregators can be captured by the
7
adversary.
Each node at any given time can be an information source (end-node),
a relay with local function (aggregator), or a destination node (base station).
The first two can encounter the captured node problem.
Assumption 2 The base station is assumed to be trusted, and to be capable
of one hop downlink communications.
The base station is usually assumed to be a permanent reliable and
trusted authority and impervious to compromise by adversaries. The base
station is located in some safe location that adversaries can not have access to
and is usually run in the presence of a human operator. Furthermore, there are
enough resources for the base station to be able to broadcast its queries across
the entire network by high power radio as it requires only one investment and
is therefore affordable.
Assumption 3 The pairwise key establishment mechanism is considered to
be available for authentic communication among neighbors by one of the
schemes proposed in [2, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Also, we assume to have a distributed
revocation mechanism to revoke a detected captured node [17].
Below, we define the new terms we use throughout this work which are
not defined previously in the literature or are defined differently than what we
mean here.
Definition 1 Neighbors of a node is a set of nodes which are in one hop
distance of that node and have common shared keys with it.
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Definition 2 Node degree is the number of neighbors for a particular node.
Definition 3 Effective node degree is the number of legitimate neighbors
for a particular node.
Definition 4 Independent adversaries refer to those adversary agents which
try to capture legitimate nodes without any knowledge from other adversary
agents’ activities.
Definition 5 Colluding adversaries refer to those adversary agents which
have common knowledge on the information gathered by each of them.
1.2 Communications and Adversary Models
Capturing a node by an adversary can happen in three stages. (i) The adver-
sary has to discover a network node in order to physically gain access to it. The
adversary at this stage can only attack the network by modifying the inputs to
its target nodes. Despite the fact that this environment-manipulation attack
is a severe attack by an adversary, it can be very expensive for the adversary
to launch this attack. Because of the redundant observation assumption of an
event of interest, the adversary has to modify the inputs of enough nodes to
impose a significant impact on the network. We assume that the occurrence
of such an attack is not very likely. However, we should note that in terms of
countering this threat, nothing can be done at this stage because of the typical
deployment of the network in a hostile environment. (ii) After the discovery of
a target by the adversary, the adversary starts its capture process on the target
node by disassembling it in order to get access to the target’s internal state,
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particularly its secrets. This accessing time to the target’s internal state is a
time consuming procedure for the adversary in order to complete its capture
process. The amount of time it takes for the adversary to succeed the capture
process is non-deterministic and depends on the physical node protection, the
level of obfuscation, the environmental conditions of the sensors’ installation
site, and the skill and technology level of the adversary. During this stage,
the target node would face some delay in its normal function. This delay and
interruption of the normal functionality of a node under capture is implied as
the adversary must disassemble the hardware of its target node in order to
get to its internal states. The adversary’s goal at this stage is to complete the
capture process as soon as possible in order to be able to corrupt the com-
munication in the network through the captured node. Using the continuous
monitoring phenomenon, we require each node to engage with others to in-
sure its survival. Therefore, the adversary on a captured node needs to follow
this monitory protocol too. The adversary’s goal here is to finish the capture
process fast enough to be able to participate in the monitoring protocol. The
in-capture phase, introduced earlier, is in charge of dealing with this stage.
(iii) After completion of the capture process, the adversary gets access to the
key materials of the captured node and can launch various attacks against the
network. At this stage, the adversary may or may not launch an attack but it
certainly has that capability to do so at will. Potential attacks at this stage
include colluding with other captured nodes, control of the captured node’s ac-
tivities such as malicious aggregation of incoming traffic, multiple replications
of the captured node and distributing them across the network [17], replace-
ment of captured nodes in different neighborhoods, and running a Sybil attack
[18]. The introduced post-capture detection phase is supposed to counter this
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stage of the adversary’s behavior, which is out of the scope of this research.
Below, we summarize the common assumptions for communications and
adversary models in the literature addressing the captured node problem in
WSNs. We adopt some of the following assumptions from [17] and we leave
protocol-specific assumptions for later as necessary.
Assumption 4 The adversary has a universal communication presence in any
part of the network at any time.
This assumption implies that an adversary can simultaneously send and
receive an arbitrary number of messages in any part of the network at any time
through the captured nodes.
Assumption 5 The adversary can perform selective but incremental node
capture.
Assumption 6 The adversary can not block or significantly delay commu-
nications. We assume that an adversary is unable to jam or delay commu-
nications between legitimate nodes because of the underlying radio broadcast
property.
This assumption stresses the distinction between the coercive and stealthy
attackers. The focus of this work is particularly on the latter case for which
the objective is to detect the presence of stealthy attackers presiding over cap-
tured nodes. However, addressing coercive attackers, e.g., jammers, is beyond
the scope of this research mainly because their presence is obviously detectable
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by the network. The challenge in these cases is how to counter against coer-
cive attackers despite knowledge of their existence, rather than in the stealthy
cases the challenge is whether there are any attackers or not.
Assumption 7 Neither the adversary nor the random failure of nodes can
partition the network. So, we assume that the network is connected even with
the presence of adversaries.
Assumption 8 The adversary can not manipulate the environment. This as-
sumption excludes those adversaries that change the surrounding environment
of sensor nodes in order to make them report false data.
Assumption 9 Collisions or transmission errors in communication are possi-




In this chapter, we will briefly go over the previous works that are related to
the node capture problem in WSNs. In this context, we categorize the pro-
posed schemes in four different classes: spatial diversity, temporal diversity,
replication detection, and secure aggregation.
Spatial Diversity. There is a couple of works done in spatial diversity
in which the basic idea is to protect the secrets by distributing them among
multiple modules hoping that compromising some, but not all, of the modules
by adversaries would result in only partial exposures. The most known works
based on this idea include threshold cryptographic schemes, all-or-nothing
protection method, proactive secret sharing methods, remotely-keyed scheme,
key-insulated scheme, and intrusion-resilient scheme. We will not go into fur-
ther detail of these classes of methodologies since there are fundamental weak-
nesses that all of them suffer from. Some common prohibitive features of these
schemes are as follows. Distribution is costly and not affordable for ordinary
nodes in WSN made of low cost commodities. Also, there is no guaranteed
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connectivity among multiple machines containing partial share of the secrets.
This problem becomes clearer while encountering nodes having less degree
than the required threshold. No matter what happens, they are incapable of
successful activities due to shortages of partial shares.
Recently, a new scheme based on spatial diversity has been proposed
using a threshold based method known as interleaved hop-by-hop authentica-
tion [19], which is capable of countering a fixed number of captured nodes. If
supposedly they want to counter with N − 1 number of captured nodes, they
decompose the scheme into modulus N , grouping each set of N nodes in par-
allel branches such that the nodes are ordered sequentially in a route towards
destination modulo N . Every node corresponds to the one on the same order
in the consecutive modulus batches. This is basically to parallelize the system
into N branches and place them in order sequentially. Therefore, if there are
at most N − 1 captured nodes having malicious behavior, after one cycle of N
hops at least one legitimate node would not follow their conspiracy. Instead,
that one legitimate node behaves inconsistently with them, resulting in the de-
tection of any existing malicious activity in that cycle. Then at most after N
hops penetrating bogus traffic into the network, this mal-functionality will be
detected and therefore the required revocation procedure would be in charge
of dealing with suspicious compromised nodes. Also there are variations to
these schemes in which they split N group member nodes more sparsely [20].
This will cause more robustness to the tolerable number of captured nodes
while letting deeper penetration of illegitimate traffic into the network. Also
revocation would exclude the whole suspicious group, sacrificing more inno-
cent nodes than the original version.
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The problem of these resiliency approaches lie in the practicality of the
choice of the threshold N . From one aspect, although N can theoretically
be any number of nodes, it should be as large as possible in order to be able
to overcome more captured nodes. In contrast, N can not be too large as
it imposes more overhead into traffic. Also the larger the value of N is, the
more penetration of the adversary and consequently the stronger the impact
of attack against network operation. At minimum, this can result in a battery
of nodes being exhausted in the route. So, typically the proposed number for
N in literature is around 5-10. Our claim is that there is no reason that an
adversary who is capable of compromising this number of nodes can not cap-
ture more than that. This implies that an adversary knows the threshold of
breakage in security of these systems in advance and therefore would invest in
overcoming this threshold to launch a successful attack against network oper-
ation. This is a common problem in most majority voting schemes with some
fixed property in the underlying infrastructure in which deterministic criterion
known a priori to everyone including adversaries let them defeat the threshold
and break the system. Moreover, if captured nodes are located less than N
hops away from the base station, there is ambiguity in detection and therefore
the scheme is vulnerable in the vicinity of the base station, particularly within
a partial cycle. This issue refers to the region which usually carries the most
traffic load of the network and often is considered as the hot region of the
network.
Two other works have been introduced recently [21, 22] using attestation
techniques with different approaches to tackle the compromised node problem.
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The authors in [21] propose a scheme to detect the trustworthiness of cluster
heads based on the verification of cluster nodes through a Trusted Platform
Module placed on each cluster head. This verification procedure can be either
performed as a broadcast or unicast between cluster head and cluster nodes
and determines whether or not the system integrity of the cluster head has
been tampered with. The main drawback of this scheme comes from the un-
derlying assumption that the adversary’s goal is to compromise cluster heads.
In contrast, it is quite rational for an adversary to look for the most vulnerable
points in the network to launch its attack, which in this case would be clus-
ter nodes, relay nodes, and the scheme is incapable of countering against it.
On the other hand, [22] provides a software-based attestation scheme to ver-
ify the integrity of code running each node in a distributed manner through
the interaction among its neighbors. Their proposed schemes are based on
a pseudo-random noise generation mechanism and a lightweight block-based
pseudo-random memory traversal algorithm. The scheme is essentially a self-
organized checksum-based approach to detect any inconsistency between the
expected memory content of the suspicious node and the actual memory con-
tent of some of its neighbors. Despite the usage of obfuscation by imposing
pseudo-random memory traversal to harden data extraction for attackers upon
a node capture, severely restricted memory space in sensor nodes does not pro-
vide enough flexibility for such maneuvering. In addition, the proposed scheme
relies on the assumption of an available safe interval upon deployment dur-
ing which nodes can exchange their secret shares. This assumption is simply
violated by the scalability requirements of sensor networks just because once
nodes are added during the lifetime of the network, a safe interval can no
longer be available.
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In the context of resiliency against node capture, there are a few recent
works that try to introduce relevant metrics to assess security vulnerabilities in
the presence of node capture. Patrick Tague, et al. in [23] propose an analysis
toolkit to find the vulnerability points of the network which takes into account
the joint effects of routing and security protocols. This is based on the intro-
duced vulnerability metric and can be employed either by the designer or by
the attacker, except the attacker needs to put in more effort to estimate some
unknown parameters of the scheme. Also, node capture attack is formalized
by virtue of the defined metric. Similarly, Di Pietro, et al. in [24] provide
another metric for characterization of node capture.
Temporal Diversity. Now we want to look at some recent works using
temporal diversity. The main approaches in this category include key evolu-
tion methods, forward and backward security mechanism, and tamper evidence
method. As opposed to the previous case, a legitimate node has more control
than adversaries as he decides when to do what procedures in order to make
the whole system secured, to the extent that he needs. In addition, adversaries
usually do not have enough flexibility at the time of capturing and launching
their attacks. It is desirable from the adversaries’ point of view to capture
nodes as soon as possible right after deployment of WSN, but doing so is not
feasible right away and usually takes some time for them to physically capture
particular nodes or a particular fraction of network. Along this idea Ander-
son, et al. [25] proposed a scheme for maintaining system security over time
which assumed that right after deployment full security has existed among
nodes and they can simply establish pair-wise key in plain text for later us-
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age. They justify this assumption by investigating the influence of potential
attacks provided the realistic economical barriers of adversaries are present all
across the network region upon deployment for sudden capturing and exposing
keys. However, this assumption neglects the fact that it is highly likely for
the adversary to capture very few nodes and remain on them for long term,
launching malicious activities over time which can be disseminated across the
network and have significant impact on network traffic. Another way to look
at this approach is to assume the network is fully trusted initially [26] and try
to preserve this trust relation over time. Although this seems to be a good
choice, it conflicts with the scalability assumption required for WSN applica-
tions as this does not allow the addition of any new nodes to the network later
on. In our methodology we consider the case in which the network is started
with the initial trust granted to all nodes from the same central authority and
we do our best to prevent its decay over the lifetime of network’s operation as
a result of an increase of the amount of threats from adversaries.
The basic idea behind key evolution methods is to perform more cryp-
tographic operations being implemented securely using a single key. This is
usually done by a random evolution procedure on the signer’s state which
leads to limiting the effects of compromising the current key. The Monotone
Signature scheme [27] is an instantiation of such a methodology where some,
but not all, secrets are revealed to the adversary under duress and the ad-
versary can get valid signatures according to the current verification scheme.
Here there is no question regarding detection of the adversary’s presence as
everyone is supposedly well aware of any victim nodes under duress. However,
the issue is how to counter such a situation. As a countermeasure, the verifi-
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cation algorithm in the recovery phase after attack would be updated in such
a way that all signer’s signatures before and after the update remain valid
but the adversary’s signatures become invalid in the updated version of the
verification method. A variant of this approach is to keep the updated ver-
ification secret, known as Funkspiel [28]. Pedersen and Pfitzmann proposed
the Fail-Stop signatures [29] in which none of signer’s secrets are exposed to
the adversary. Instead, each public key corresponds to a large number of valid
private keys. The idea here is that the adversaries are assumed to be compu-
tationally powerful while legitimate nodes are relatively slow. Therefore, the
adversary is capable of computing all the secret keys associated with a specific
public key. However, she can not find out which one is used by a legitimate
signer and the signer can repudiate the forged signature.
Bellare and Yee proposed a backward security scheme [30] in which they
try to preserve previous system security even with exposure of current key ma-
terials to adversaries and save the security of old traffic. Most of the proposed
research in this field is implemented based on the PKI cryptosystem where a
series of public keys and their corresponding secret keys go through an update
procedure [31]. Then only a single root public key needs to be certified and
the rest can be evaluated from the root key using the update scheme. In the
update procedure, first the new key is calculated and then the previous one is
discarded after usage. In symmetric key cryptosystems, backward security can
be achieved following these steps. Any shared key between two principals is
usually passed through a one way hash function at several agreed upon times
in order to update the new keys. These schemes are stateful in the sense that
in each invocation of the update procedure, outputs are produced as a function
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of the current state resulting in an updated state and the deletion of the old
state. The initial state (seed) is generated through a probabilistic scheme such
as a pseudo-random bit generator, which stretches a short seed into a longer
sequence. Then a deterministic state update procedure is employed for key
evolution. The operation of these schemes is divided into consecutive stages
and update and deletion take place at the end of each stage. Thus if an ad-
versary breaks into the system, she can only obtain the current state at any
single point in time. And by using a one way update procedure, recovery of
previous states or previous outputs would be infeasible due to their computa-
tional indistinguishability resulting from their random independent sequences.
Interestingly, pseudo-random functions deployed here are only required to be
secure against a very small number of queries which can be instantiated by
block ciphers or hash functions. These methods fall into a bigger class of
generators using iterated one way permutation based paradigms. The typical
applications of such schemes can be used in various domains such as message
authentication or secure audit logs. In the authentication scenario, key expo-
sure makes previous authentic messages untrustworthy. So parties involved in
the authentication procedure have to use the current key for both creation and
verification of authentication tags in order for messages to correspond to the
current stage. As a result, a break-in adversary having the current key is un-
able to forge the MAC generated by previous keys. Ordinary MAC protocols
such as CBC-MAC, HMAC, and UMAC can be used for the authentication
process. On the other hand, in the secure audit log application of backward
security, the attacker tries to modify past log entries and erase the record of
previous attempts at break-ins to change and improve its reputation history.
From the administrator’s perspective it is desirable to prevent such modifi-
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cations and to create a suitable scenario for deploying a backward security
feature. Also in order to prevent the re-ordering and deletion of previous mes-
sages one can simply use appropriate sequence numbers.
Anderson in [32] proposed another security feature along the same line,
known as forward security, in which the goal is to prevent the exposure of
future traffic by compromising current keys. This can be achieved by various
techniques such as regular re-keying, auto re-keying, and offline storage of all
future keys. Particularly the auto re-keying methods are studied in symmetric
cryptosystems in which shared keys between pairs are hashed at agreed times
with all exchanged messages since the last key change. This leads to a security
recovery in the event the attacker misses only a single message exchanged be-
tween the two parties. Although this seems like a promising approach, it can
easily backfire since the synchronicity between parties are very fragile and it
might unintentionally hurt the legitimate interaction between the parties for
any slight asynchrony.
Another work recently proposed in this context is tamper evidence [33],
whose goal is to provide security after the full exposure of key materials to the
inconspicuous adversary. It promises to detect an adversary’s presence in the
system even after all secrets are exposed to the adversary. The way it works is
based on a stateless scheme in which two signatures are given to it as inputs
and it detects an inconsistency between these two signatures if they are not is-
sued by the same identity, either a legitimate insider or an adversarial insider.
The reason is that if the two signatures are derived from the same identity,
based on the construction of private keys one of these two key strings should
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contain the other, i.e., one of them is the subset of the other. If two different
identities have issued them, they do not have such a relation. Therefore the
verifier, which can be a suspicious node’s neighbor, would take two instances
of signatures from the suspicious node and check for a possible containment
relation. If it does not hold, then the verifier detects the divergence between
the two given signatures. The idea is to use a random evolution mechanism of
two versions of signatures associated with each identity, i.e., legitimate signer
and forger. The scheme also allows some cases of tampering to be missed and
depending on how long the time differences between the two given signatures
are, various modifications of the scheme give a different security level of tamper
detection with their corresponding costs. In addition to the PKI based cryp-
tosystem’s design, the tamper evidence mechanism suffers from some other
shortcomings as follows. As the adversary is considered to have full control
over all inputs and outputs of the victim node, she can choose the time of the
two signatures issued for the verifier. Therefore in a new attack, which was
not previously considered, the adversary can simply pass two forged signatures
with proper evolution which is consistent with the verification procedure and
can pass it successfully. This attack scenario is likely for adversaries who stay
on the victim node over a period of time and, unfortunately, the proposed
method is incapable of countering it. As long as the adversary remains on the
victim node, the verification procedure would fail until the legitimate signer
has the opportunity to cast his signature to the verifier. A more suitable
case seems to be when a stealthy adversary captures a node, exposes its keys
and leaves that victim node, possibly replicating that identity somewhere else.
Through this simultaneous challenge between legitimate signer and adversary,
the verification could be successful provided that these two signature versions
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are received by the same verifier, which is an unrealistic scenario.
Replication Detection. Recently there is some other research proposed
to encounter captured node problems from different viewpoints [34, 35]. In
[34] the authors propose a scheme for detection and recovery of node cloning
attacks. Cloned nodes are multiple replications of a legitimate node captured
by an adversary and distributed in the network. Their scheme is based on
usage statistics of nodes’ keys. The drawbacks of this scheme include the cen-
tral detection approach, revocation of the keys and not necessarily revoking
the cloned nodes, and its inappropriate assumption that the distribution of
key usage is a direct consequence of the number of cloned nodes. The other
research in this context is replication detection [35] in which the scheme finds
the presence of replicated nodes in the network in a distributed fashion. This
scheme has the ability to find collisions of multiple copies of the same iden-
tity somewhere in the network by some random observer nodes and propagate
collision flags throughout the network. Although this scheme works properly
for replication detection scenarios, it can not handle the detection of each cap-
tured node individually.
H. Fu, et al. [36] follow the research on replication attacks. The main
focus of their work is on the resiliency analysis of the well-known random key
pre-distribution schemes against replication attacks. In their work, they pro-
posed three different metrics to capture the notion of resiliency for analyzing
the security of wireless sensor networks in the presence of replicated nodes. The
soundness of their proposed metrics are highly under question for the following
reasons. (i) They impose the assumption that in their approach the adversary
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somehow has the control over the structure of the hardware of a replicated
node. This assumption is not true in general, and at most the attacker may
copy the malicious code into the replicated node’s memory, but cannot change
the size of its memory. (ii) The impact of a replicated node on the security
of the network across the network terrain is not uniform, which is considered
in contrary here. (iii) The evaluation of the metrics of interest are quite costly.
Figure 2.1: Sensor nodes can have various functionalities such as end-nodes,
aggregators, or base station.
Secure aggregation. In numerous research, secure aggregation has been
addressed ranging from protocol designs [37, 38] to application development
[39] and mathematical foundations [40]. In the Secure Information Aggrega-
tion method (SIA) [37], there are three types of nodes considered in WSN;
end-nodes, aggregators, and base station as is shown in Fig. 2.1. Aggregators
are in charge of local processing within the network and the design requires
sub-linear communications between the aggregator and base station in order
to aggregate the measurements and pass the result and also guarantee that
reported result is valid and not corrupted by the aggregator. This is done
through a three phase process namely as aggregate-commitment-proof. In the
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aggregation phase, the authenticated inputs are combined by the desired ag-
gregation function with the result being forwarded to the base station. In
the Commitment phase, inputs define a binary Merkle hash tree [41] in which
the root is a commitment to all participating inputs and the authentic root
is sent to the base station. Whenever the base station wants to verify the
authenticity of any input, it may require the aggregator to forward that input
with the corresponding inputs in the tree authenticated by end-nodes and then
the base station confirms the root by making a dual Merkle tree to obtain a
dual root. In the proof phase, the aggregator and base station are engaged
in an efficient interactive proof process in order to check the validity of the
result reported by the aggregator. Private shared keys are required between
each end-node/aggregator pair and end-node/base station pair which lead to
guaranteeing the authenticity of reading from end-nodes in the aggregators.
Also using an efficient interactive proof between each aggregator and base sta-
tion guarantees the legitimate activity of the aggregator deriving results and
reporting to the base station. However, there is no way to check the validity of
reading in the compromised end-nodes as adversaries have access to all keying
information in end-nodes upon capturing them.
As mentioned above, aggregators are the main part of their design; how-
ever, there are no arguments about their placement and also their capabilities.
It is assumed that they are the same as end-nodes which is true based on a
flat network scenario, but there are a couple of issues with the design. (i)
Putting particular function into specific nodes, i.e., fixed aggregators, causes
them to be exhausted quickly and also increases their vulnerabilities as their
additional roles make them more critical targets from the adversaries’ point of
25
view. (ii) There are issues about connectivity to aggregators. From one end,
there should be as many aggregators as possible so that end nodes can reach
them with the least number of intermediate hops (relays) in order to reduce
communication overheads and get a better aggregation factor. This implies
that there should be more aggregators placed in lower levels of the routing tree,
i.e. closer to end-nodes. However from the other end, it is desirable to have
fewer aggregators in higher levels of the routing tree, i.e., towards the base
station, where the traffic is more dense and fewer intermediate hops (relays)
are needed to connect the aggregators with the base station. This is crucial
as the authentication and interactive proof schemes between the aggregator
and the base station assumes a trusted path between them. Otherwise, it is
easy for adversaries to be in the middle of the two and to disrupt the security
interaction between them in order to cause a failure of legitimate interactions,
especially through colluding adversaries placed before and after the aggrega-
tors.
Furthermore, each end-node needs to have a shared key with the corre-
sponding aggregators in the potential route towards the destination, i.e. base
station. But because of the ad-hoc nature of WSN, there is no infrastructure
in the network and the placement of nodes prior to deployment is random.
Therefore, there is no guarantee which nodes should act as aggregators and
also with which aggregators, nodes should keep their corresponding shared
keys, which imposes inefficient overheads in trusted path key establishments.
These arguments suggest considering that aggregation be done through the
WSN randomly over any nodes rather than through fixed aggregators with
battery exhaustion and critical target vulnerabilities. However doing so on
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every hop basis may not gain a significant aggregation factor. Therefore by
using some predefined counter, aggregation can be made once every couple of
hops in each route. This parameter should optimally be evaluated in run time
or prior to deployment for specific traffic and topology. It is more likely to get
a better estimate of that in run time; however, we should notice that it needs
to be evaluated in a distributed manner. As another choice of when to do
aggregation, one may choose to aggregate on every hop basis, provided that
there is something to aggregate. Otherwise wait until there is enough inputs
required for aggregation (at least two inputs) and then evaluate and pass the
aggregation result to the next hop.
Yi Yang, et al. in [42] follow the SIA protocol proposed in [37] to deal
with secure aggregation. The proposed scheme consists of two steps, namely
divide-and-conquer and commit-and-attest and overcomes the shortcomings of
SIA from the following aspects. (i) Using a probabilistic approach for choos-
ing aggregators prevents adversaries to reveal them in advance. This results
in the elimination of targeting aggregators a priori. (ii) The scheme uses an
in-network aggregation approach, which leads to a higher aggregation ratio
and lower energy consumption compared to the ones for SIA. (iii) The scheme
provides a weighted aggregation feature among all subtrees. However, the
scheme has its own drawbacks including its reliance on the redundant observ-
ability assumption of the event of interest and lack of defense against bogus
data injection through captured leaf nodes. It may be quite possible that the
aggregation values corresponding to some rare events are mistakenly consid-
ered illegitimate merely because they are not supported globally and are only
partially observed in some subtrees of the network. In addition, aggregation
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queries are initiated through base stations rather than as an event driven pro-
cess by network nodes.
On the other hand, secure aggregation in [38] proposes a method to
aggregate gradually while going in the route towards the base station. There-
fore there is no particular aggregator node which aggregates all local inputs.
Instead, each node aggregates whatever it gets and passes it on to the next
hop towards base station. The key idea in their design is to use the µTESLA
key chain [1] and disclose keys with some delay so that after the disclosure of
the keys, no one can use those keys for authentication but the verifier, i.e., the
base station, which can check the messages authenticated by nodes using those
keys previously. This disclosure delay causes transfer and storage of whole ag-
gregated messages during this delay interval until the base station finishes the
verification phase. Also the verification process is not an efficient scheme and
it is initiated by the base station and goes downward until the end-nodes and
comes back to it which is longer path than being originated by some neighbor-
hood entities closer to end-nodes which are information sources. This suggests
eliminating the corrupted data from network traffic as early as possible and
preventing penetration of the bogus traffic based on local decisions made in
the closest vicinity of its origin. The problem with their security mechanism
is that all aggregation results go all the way up to the base station and remain
there until the base station authenticates the messages downstream or else it
discards them. So, if there are illegitimate messages, there is no reason for
them to be carried all the way up to the base station and discarded after a
while since it imposes significant communication overheads, which is in con-
trast to the notion of aggregation.
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Besides, there is a spatial delay in aggregation nodes, meaning that
inputs will not be aggregated in their immediate parent but in their immediate
grandparent. This delay in aggregation placement causes more overhead in
exchange for obtaining resiliency against a single node being captured by an
adversary. Although this can be a valuable feature for the price of extra
overhead to their scheme, there is no reason that the underlying sensor network
can not face with additional captured nodes. As discussed earlier, for the same
reason that an adversary can compromise one node, she would be able to
capture as many nodes as necessary in order to disrupt network functionality
or mislead it by corrupting inputs leading to unintentional behavior of the
network. Unfortunately, this scheme is unable to counter such attack scenarios.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Pinging Methods for in-
capture Detection
Dealing with the proposed problems in Chapter 1, we use the following three
facts which have a significant impact on our proposed methods to the well-
known captured node problem in WSNs.
Fact 1 Capturing a target node by an adversary in order to get the target’s
internal states is a physically time consuming process. This process requires a
nonzero interval of time for an adversary to complete its capture process.
Fact 2 During the capture process of a target node, the target node will be
unable to function properly due to its hardware disassembly by the adversary.
This operational interruption upon hardware manipulation is governed by the
current hardware technology used in sensor nodes.
Fact 3 Any solution with a fixed resiliency threshold is incapable of countering
the captured node problem in WSNs.
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The schemes proposed previously regarding the captured node problem
are typically capable of overcoming the problem up to a certain fixed number
of captured nodes. This resiliency threshold can not be too high because of
the prohibitive overhead introduced by the underlying schemes. Therefore,
having a threshold of the order of five to at most ten captured nodes resiliency
would not be attainable because of the following reasons. (i) For the same
reason that an adversary is capable of capturing up to the threshold number
of nodes, it can exceed that threshold and eventually break the resiliency of
the scheme. (ii) The threshold is a pre-defined deterministic one and even
though the adversary may not be aware of it in advance, it can gradually in-
crease the number of captured nodes until the scheme is broken. This seems
to suggest that it is better to prevent an adversary’s success in capturing any
target nodes as much as possible. Here we try to stop an adversary’s progress
in capturing nodes by detecting its presence on target nodes during the cap-
ture process and revoking those nodes under capture.
As mentioned earlier, the adversary’s goal in capturing nodes is to in-
fluence the legitimate traffic of the network as much as possible so that it
can deceive the base station or deplete the limited resources of existing nodes
encountering bogus traffic. This can be done by modifying ongoing traffic or
by injecting illegitimate data through captured nodes. Transferred messages
should be authentic in the receiver or else they will be discarded. In order
to authenticate messages, the sender needs to have valid key materials, thus
the adversary can get them by means of capturing legitimate nodes already
participating on the network. Therefore once the node is captured, the ad-
versary gains access to the internal state of the node and keys are revealed.
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After the capture phase is complete, any traffic from that node would not be
distinguishable from the legitimate traffic from receiver’s point of view. How-
ever, we can restrict the impact of the adversary’s presence at the captured
nodes during the capture phase. This approach would be feasible by using
Fact 1, i.e., the capture phase which refers to the duration that a capture is in
progress, which requires the physical touch and presence of an adversary on
the participating nodes targeted for being captured. For an adversary, it takes
some time in order to eventually get into the internal memory of any node and
during this capture phase there is a discontinuity in the normal operational
behavior of the target node. If we assume this time consuming procedure of
capture completion is comparable with the execution period of our proposed
mechanisms for captured node detection, we can detect when the node is un-
der the capture phase before the adversary succeeds in capturing the node and
starts injecting bogus data on to the network. We refer to these approaches as
the in-capture detection mechanism. In the following sections we will discuss
our two proposed approaches, the pairwise pinging scheme and the quorum
pinging scheme in details in order to achieve this goal. The summary of the
notation used throughout this work is given in Table 3.1.
3.1 Pairwise Pinging Scheme
In this scheme each node is watched by its neighbors. Time is divided into
consecutive epochs. In each epoch, we define K different time intervals which
are assigned for the operation of each node based on its identification (ID). A
possible assignment policy can be as follows:
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Parameter Description
kij Shared key between nodes i and j
H(kij ; .) Keyed Hash function of a message using key kij
K Number of communication intervals in each epoch
Interval no(i) Index of the interval corresponding to node i
Tp Duration of an interval assigned for each node’s communication
Te Duration of each epoch containing all slotted communication intervals
T Duration of detection interval
n Index of the corresponding epoch
M Number of states or number of epochs in each detection interval
X Random variable for the time an adversary can complete a capture
fX(x) The pdf of X
ηx Average of X
d Average node degree
deff Effective node degree
pr Probability of pinging a node in the assigned interval
pl Probability of packet loss
pe Probability of successful reception of a ping response message
Ps Probability of being at state s
Ns Number of times a node is in state s
Ts Random variable for the residual time-to-false-alarm given in state s
T ∗
(i)
Arrival time of the ith false alarm
q Quorum size
Pm Probability of a missed detection for pairwise scheme
P
(q)
m Probability of a missed detection for q-node quorum scheme




Expected residual time-to-false-alarm for q-node quorum scheme
P
(q)
F.A. Probability of false alarm for q-node quorum scheme
NA Total number of deployed adversary agents
n
(j)
A Number of collaborative agents associated with j
th adversary agent
AS Number of successful adversary agents in capturing their targets
dj
eff
Effective node degree of a node targeted by jth adversary agent
Table 3.1: List of used notations
Interval no(i) = [i mod(K − 1)] + 1 1 ≤ Interval no(i) ≤ K − 1
(3.1)
Each node with its particular ID, (e.g., i) can send out its ping messages
only during its corresponding time interval, however, the response messages
can be heard at any time interval. These messages include a nonce and are
authenticated by the pairwise key kij shared between neighbors i and j using
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a keyed hash function H(kij; .). Note that kij = kji in our symmetric setting.
The nonce is a random number chosen by the sender. Once a neighbor sends
its ping message at its corresponding time interval to the watched node, the
watched node has to respond in the next time interval. In order to check the
successful reception and validity of this exchange, the watched node is required
to increment the nonce in the ping message and authenticate it again in the
response message with their common shared key, then respond back to its
neighbor. The structure of the ping and response messages are as follows:
ping message: i → j i, j, (nonce), H(kij; nonce)
response message: j → i j, i, (nonce + 1), H(kji; nonce + 1)
(3.2)
If the watched node misses this acknowledgement, it will be flagged as a
suspicious node by its neighbor who initiated the exchange. The acknowledge-
ment failures include cases in which a response is not received during the next
time interval, the response is received with inappropriate message content, or
the messages fail to be delivered due to unreliable wireless communication.
These events would lead to a raised a flag against the watched node, and de-
pending on the deployed revocation policy, the required procedure for making
a decision regarding that node would be executed.
Obviously, this exchange among each pair of neighboring nodes imposes
a certain overhead to the network performance, both in communications and
computations. We modify the scheme in such a way that the neighbors initi-
ate the pinging exchange in a random fashion with a specific probability. The
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intuition behind this modification is as follows. (i) By imposing randomness
to the initiation of the exchange, the following property holds: the invoking of
the exchange procedure by the adversary at an inappropriate time can penal-
ize the adversary and can be used as a sign for the presence of the adversary
on a node. (ii) By not pinging the watched node in every epoch, the commu-
nication and computation costs of the proposed scheme is reduced.
Now, if an adversary starts capturing a node, the node can not respond
to a potential ping message initiated by at least one of its neighbors. As we
discussed earlier, the engaging of the node by the adversary into a capture
phase causes an interruption in the normal operation of that node. Given that
there is a neighbor of the node that initiated the ping message, missing the
opportunity for the node to respond to its neighbor leads to a flag raised by
the neighbor against the node.
Though, to account for cases in which either the ping message or its
response may be lost due to communication errors, the neighbor should not
immediately declare the watched node as captured upon not receiving the
response message. Instead, we set a detection interval during which if the
response is missed for a fixed number of times, then the neighbor can raise a
flag against the watched node. Following this procedure, in order to have a
successful capture, the adversary needs to complete the capture phase of the
target node within the detection interval.
The above argument suggests that the pinging rate be increased in or-
der to increase the rate of the detection of the presence of an adversary on
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a target node by at least one of the target node’s neighbors. However, this
results in higher communication and computation costs to the network which
may become a prohibitive factor for using the pinging scheme.
Besides, changing the length of the detection interval is an optimization
problem of security versus performance. By increasing the detection interval,
more opportunity is given to the adversary to complete its capture process of
a target node, while reducing the detection interval leads to the increase of
the probability of raising a flag against an innocent watched node by mistake,
resulting in a false alarm. Hence, we present a mathematical model in the
following section as a tool to set proper values for the aforementioned param-
eters. The parameters of the model can be selected in such a way that the
pinging scheme provides the desired security and performance measures such
as the probability of a missed detection and the expected lifetime of a node for
a given adversary. Our objective of invoking the pinging scheme is to achieve a
certain performance of the proposed mechanism with acceptable costs, namely
minimizing the probability of a missed detection and maximizing the expected
node and network lifetime.
3.1.1 Modeling of the Pairwise Pinging Scheme
In this section, we present a model based on discrete event formulation [43, 44]
for the proposed scheme in which we are interested in evaluating the probabil-
ity of detecting a target node under the capture phase by one of its neighbors.
Each node, potentially a node targeted for being captured by the adversary,
is considered to have d neighbors and each of the neighbors with certain prob-
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ability pr decides to initiate the ping message for the target node. A sensor
node may fail to respond to a ping triggered by one of its neighbors for dif-
ferent reasons, such as; being under capture phase, its battery being depleted,
or even being physically damaged. The ping message or its response can be
lost due to collision or congestion during communication. We assume a ping
message in the assigned interval or its response in the next interval can be lost
with probability pl.
To avoid being flagged as captured, a target node has to respond to
the ping message upon receiving it from any of the neighbors. By appropriate
choices of the parameters in normal mode of operation, each node would be
able to respond the acknowledgement message within the next time interval.
However, in case of capture as discussed in Section 1.2, the target node would
face some delay in its functionality due to physical access time to the internal
states, memory content, and particularly its keys by the adversary. The access
time procedure is not deterministic. The time it takes depends on the physical
node protection, level of obfuscation, environmental conditions of the sensors’
installation site, and the skill and technology level of the adversary. There-
fore, we use a random variable X with probability distribution function (pdf)
fX(x) to model the necessary time for the adversary to complete the capture
of a sensor node. This includes the search time for sensors’ components, disas-
sembling them, and the accessing time to their internal states. We assume ηx
denotes the expected value of random variable X. In practical situations, ηx
varies from several minutes to several tens of minutes. We can achieve fX(x)
a priori by invoking an offline statistical procedure for fitting a theoretical
distribution. The proposed theoretical distribution should be matched with
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the histogram of the actual data of the corresponding variable gathered by the
offline experiments.
The other parameter of interest in mathematical formulation is the tim-
ing of receiving a ping message by the target node. Assume the time is slotted
into epochs of length Te, and each epoch of length Te is slotted into K inter-
vals, each with length Tp, i.e., Te = KTp. One of the intervals of length Tp is
assigned to each of the nodes, during which time it decides whether or not to
ping its neighbor. Fig. 3.1 shows the placement of intervals in each epoch and
their assignments to each node based on their index. A sensor node pings its
neighbor with probability pr during each assigned interval. Randomization of
ping messages is necessary in order to make them unpredictable for the adver-
sary. After pinging, the node that initiated the pinging waits one interval Tp
for a response from its watched neighbor. As long as a watched node responds
to its ping messages in the next assigned intervals, its neighbors assess it as
a legitimate node. A small deviation can be accepted to account for possible
collisions or transmission errors in the physical communication layer, however,
a long idle interval causes the neighbor of the watched node to consider the
watched node as a captured node.
Assumption 10 The pinging scheme for each pair of neighbors is performed
in a synchronized manner, i.e., pairwise synchronicity.
In order for neighbors to follow the scheme and communicate with each
other through ping messages and responses, we assume that neighbors are
synchronous. Here, we can relax this to a loose synchronization assumption
by picking an appropriate value for Tp. Tp has to account for round trip delay
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and processing time of ping message and its response. By over provisioning the
value of Tp appropriately, the scheme can tolerate some asynchrony. Note that
the synchronicity assumption is only for the execution of the pinging scheme
and it does not apply to communication pattern of network traffic.
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Figure 3.1: Time intervals in each epoch.
We assume node i pings node j with probability pr in one of the intervals
of length Tp indexed by Interval no(i). After sending the ping message, node
i waits for one time interval Tp for the response from node j. Node j is marked
captured by node i if node i does not receive any response from node j within
a long detection interval T . Obviously, Te < T and hence Tp  T . In order
to find different properties of this detector, we define the following measures:
Definition 6 False Alarm. A false alarm [45] is an event in which a node
that is not captured is classified as captured.
A false alarm can happen for two reasons. First, the random sending
of ping messages with probability pr can happen in such a way that no ping
message is sent from node i to node j in a detection interval of length T .
The second cause of a false alarm is when the ping message or its response is
lost with probability pl due to the natural transmission errors in the physical
layer during a detection interval. We assume Lf denotes the expected value
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of the lifetime of a node before a false alarm is generated or in other words,
the expected residual time-to-false-alarm. The goal is to maximize Lf .
Definition 7 Missed Detection. A missed detection is an event in which
the adversary successfully captures a node without being detected.
A missed detection can happen if the adversary performs the capture
procedure so fast that the adversary completes capture of the target node be-
fore the detection interval T elapses. We assume Pm denotes the probability of
a missed detection or simply the probability of miss. The goal is to minimize
Pm.
Given the above information, it is desirable to find the expected resid-
ual time-to-false-alarm Lf , and the probability of a missed detection Pm for
the introduced in-capture detection mechanism using pairwise pinging scheme.
Note that in order to detect a node capture, node i should not receive
any response from node j for at most M = T/Te consecutive epochs. There-
fore, in order to model the system, we consider a Markov Chain with a discrete
state Sn to represent the state of suspicion of a neighbor i about a target node
j at epoch n, and thus have 0 ≤ Sn ≤ M . The state variable is set to M and is
decremented in each epoch of length Te at the corresponding node’s interval.
In the nth epoch if node i receives a ping response from node j, the state is
reset to M . If it does not receive such a response, the state is decremented.
Once the state reaches 0, the neighbor declares node j as a captured node.
The smaller the state is, the less time remains for an adversary to complete its
capture process. It would be to the adversary’s benefit to be able to respond
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to an initiated ping message as soon as possible, provided that the adversary
could complete its capture on a target node and would be able to generate a
valid response message using the compromised keys of the target node. If the
adversary has not successfully captured the node within the next time interval
of an initiated ping message, the corresponding state of the target node, which
is kept in the neighbor, is decremented once in every epoch due to the fact
that a node under the capture phase is unable to respond to a ping message
immediately.
We use the above Markov Chain model to analyze the system given
that the node is not captured (in a nonzero state) and the system is in a
steady state. Because of the probabilistic pinging rate pr and transmission
errors with probability pl, the state of the system at any time instant can be
a value between 1 and M . The value of the state depends both on the num-
ber of successive epochs that node i decides not to ping node j and on the
number of successive epochs that node i has not received any responses after
pinging node j or any mixture of these two events. The state value defines the
remaining time for the adversary to complete its capture process before the
detection interval elapses. Consequently, we can investigate the behavior of
the system once the adversary starts the capture procedure at any time instant.
Given the above model for the state of the system, we need to define
transition probabilities of states under the assumption that the adversary has
not started a node capture. Let p(Sn, Sn+1) represent the transition probabil-
ity from state Sn at epoch n to state Sn+1 at epoch n + 1.
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Suppose pe represents the probability that node i receives a response
from node j during the nth epoch given node j is not attacked. In order to find
the transition probabilities, we need to find pe. Node i receives a ping response
from node j if two events happen: (i) node i sends a ping message to node j
at the interval indexed by Interval no(i) of the nth epoch, and (ii) neither
the ping message nor its response is lost due to communication error. Since
the two events are independent, the probability of receiving a ping response
at the nth epoch can be written as the product of the probabilities of each of
the events:
pe = pr(1 − pl) (3.3)
in which the first term is the probability of sending a ping message
and the second term is the probability of successful communications between
nodes i and j in both directions. Note that given the capture procedure is
not in progress, whenever a node with state Sn, 1 ≤ Sn ≤ M receives a
ping response, the state can only have either a transition to state Sn+1 = M
with probability p(Sn, M) = pe, or a transition to state Sn+1 = Sn − 1 with
probability p(Sn, Sn−1) = 1−pe. All other transitions happen with probability




















p(0, 0) = 1
p(0, S) = 0 1 ≤ S ≤ M
p(S, M) = pe 1 ≤ S ≤ M
p(S, S − 1) = 1 − pe 1 ≤ S ≤ M
p(S, S ′) = 0 1 ≤ S ≤ M, S ′ 6= S − 1, S ′ 6= M
(3.4)
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The discussed Markov Chain and its transition probabilities are shown
in Fig. 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Markov Chain.
In the next step, we find the steady state probabilities of presence at
each of the states in the Markov Chain. Assume node j is not being captured
or identified as a captured node. We define Ps as the steady state probability
of being at state s given s 6= 0. From a practical point of view, Ps means the
probability that Sn = s if we observe the state of Markov Chain at a randomly
chosen time epoch n. In order to find these probabilities, we consider a sig-
nificantly large time duration TL, such that TL = NTe, and M  N . During
the time duration TL, the Markov takes N states. Assume Ns represents the
number of times out of N that the Markov Chain is in state s. For a very
large N by using SLLN 1, we can write the following equations:
1SLLN refers to the Strong Law of Large Number.
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E[Ns] = (1 − pe)E[Ns+1] 1 ≤ s ≤ M − 1
E[NM ] =
∑M
s=2 peE[Ns] + E[N1]
∑M
s=1 E[Ns] = N
(3.5)
The first equation above is due to the fact that every time that we
are in the state s + 1, with probability (1 − pe), we have a transition to the
state s, and since there is no other way for a transition to state s, we have
E[Ns] = (1−pe)E[Ns+1]. The second equation uses a similar notion for state M
by considering the fact that since it is given that the chain has not transitioned
to state s = 0, a transition from state 1 to state M happens with probability
1. The third equation is due to the fact that the sum of all the values of Ns
for all s 6= 0 has to be N . If we divide both sides of the above three equations
by N, we find:
E[Ns]
N
= (1 − pe)
E[Ns+1]
N
















Now, we use the fact that E[Ns]
N
is the steady state probability of being
at state s in a random time epoch n. Therefore:
Ps = (1 − pe)Ps+1 1 ≤ s ≤ M − 1
PM =
∑M
s=2 pePs + P1
∑M
s=1 Ps = 1
(3.7)
The above is a linear system of equations that can be easily solved to
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find the value of Ps for every state s. The solution can be found by noting:
Ps = PM(1 − pe)
M−s (3.8)
The above can be found by iteratively using the first equation of Eqs.





1 − (1 − pe)M
1 ≤ s ≤ M (3.9)
A. Probability of a Missed Detection. Now, we use the steady state
probabilities in order to find the probability of a missed detection. Assume
the adversary starts the capture process at time epoch n. The Markov Chain
can be in any of the states except state 0 when the adversary starts capturing
the node. These state values may be caused by possible state decrements
in preceding epochs either by not pinging or by messages being lost during
pinging conversations. The probability of success for the adversary depends
on the value of the state at time epoch n. If the Markov Chain is at state s and
at time 0, then the adversary needs to finish capturing in sTe. In other words,
at state s and at time 0, node i has not received any response from node j for
(M − s)Te, either because it has not pinged node j or has not received any
responses for that many epochs due to packet loss. Therefore, the adversary
has only sTe time left before the capture of node j is detected by the neighbor
i. We can summarize this by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Given in state s, the necessary capture time for an adversary, X
should be less than or equal to the remaining time in the detection interval,
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sTe for a successful capture by an adversary.
Proof: In the Markov modeling of the scheme, reception of a ping re-
sponse corresponds to regenerative points in which the system goes back to
state M . Obviously X ≤ T in order to prevent the elapsing of the detection
interval. If after the last regenerative point, the adversary waits for X ∗ and
then starts its capture process, it takes the adversary X to complete its cap-
ture. So, in order to get a successful capture, (X∗ + X) ≤ T . This implies
that given in state s after X∗, the adversary has at most sTe to complete its
task, i.e., given that in state s, X ≤ sTe.
Hence, the probability of miss given Sn = s is:
p(miss|Sn = s) = P (X < sTe) (3.10)
Recall that X is the random variable that describes the necessary cap-
ture time for the adversary. The right hand side of the above equation can be
written in terms of the cumulative density function of X:






The probability of miss can be written as a conditional sum that takes










p(miss|Sn = s)Ps (3.13)
By substituting values of Ps from Eq. 3.9 and p(miss|Sn = s) from Eq.







1 − (1 − pe)M
FX(sTe) (3.14)
Note that the probability of a detection Pd which represents the prob-
ability of detecting a captured node is simply Pd = 1 − Pm.
B. Expected Residual Time-to-false-alarm. In the next step of our anal-
ysis, we find the expected value of the lifetime of a node given no attack
happens. This measure gives the quality of our proposed mechanism as a level
of its robustness to false alarms. Assume Ts represents the expected value of
the time it takes for the transition to state 0 given we are at state s at time
0. We have T0 = 0 and:
T1 = Te(1 − pe) + pe(Te + TM ) = Te + peTM (3.15)
We arrive at the above equation because if we are at state s = 1, then
it takes one time epoch Te with probability 1− pe to transition to state 0, and
with probability pe to transition to state M , in which case we need to wait
an average of TM until we have a transition to state 0. If we write the similar
equations for all the states, we find:
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T1 = Te(1 − pe) + pe(Te + TM) = Te + peTM
Ts = (Te + Ts−1)(1 − pe) + pe(Te + TM) = Te + (1 − pe)Ts−1 + peTM 2 ≤ s ≤ M − 1
TM = Te + (1 − pe)TM−1 + peTM
(3.16)
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Assume Lf denotes the expected value of the time before a false alarm















1 − (1 − pe)M
Ts (3.19)
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Remark 1 The reason for defining residual time-to-false-alarm as a measure
of describing false alarm is because of the special structure of the Markov
Chain. As state 0 is an absorbing state with nonzero transition probability,
in the long-run each state has nonzero probability to go to state 0 and remain
there. Eventually no matter where the initial state is, the final state would be
0, which can cause a false alarm due to various reasons such as malfunction-
ing, battery depletion, etc. Therefore, the long-run value of the probability
of false alarm would be 1. Instead, we use the residual time-to-false-alarm
corresponding to each state Ts in order to measure how long it takes to reach
state 0 and remain there, conditioned on being in each state. Averaging these
quantities over all possible states would result in the metric Lf which describes
the expected value of time before reaching state 0, or equivalently the inverse
rate of reaching a false alarm.
Equations 3.14 and 3.19 give us the basis for the design and analysis
of the performance of the proposed pairwise pinging scheme. We will discuss
this issue in the following section.
3.1.2 Performance Evaluation
To investigate how the scheme works, we present a numerical example and
the analytical solutions for the desired performance measures. We pick a
lognormal distribution for X as it can describe a non-negative continuous
random variable with nonzero mode and mean. Fig. 3.3 shows the pdf of a
lognormal distribution with a mean of 300sec and parameter σ = 0.5. Equa-
tion 3.20 shows the pdf of a lognormal distribution with its mean and variance.
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Figure 3.3: pdf of a Lognormal distribution with ηx = 300 sec and parameter
σ = 0.5.





Te = 5 sec
(3.21)
Fig. 3.4 depicts the probability of being at each state s for different
values of pr by solving Eq. 3.9 numerically. For example, the pinging rate of
pr = 0.3 results in concentrating most of the mass function from states 10 to
20, while in the case of pr = 0.1, the mass function is spread over the entire
state span. This observation can be explained as follows. By increasing the
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Figure 3.4: Probability of being at each state Ps v.s. state s for different
pinging rate pr.
value of pr, the system tends to be set to its regenerative points more often
and remain in higher states. Consequently, there is more time for adversaries
to complete their capture phase either before being detected or before the
elapsed detection interval. This would lead to an increase in the probability
of a missed detection Pm.
Now, we try to evaluate the sensitivity of the probability of a missed
detection Pm with respect to the detection interval T . By solving Eq. 3.14
we can see in Fig. 3.5 that for any particular value of pr, increasing the
detection interval or equivalently, increasing the number of states M would
result in a higher probability of a missed detection Pm. For example, for the
pinging rate of pr = 0.2, by increasing the detection interval from 120 sec
to 200 sec (which correspond to M = 24 and M = 40 number of states,
respectively), the probability of a missed detection is increased from 0.01 to
0.1, respectively. This observation can be justified as follows. The higher the
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detection interval we have, the longer vulnerable interval can be used by the
adversary to complete the capture phase and escape from our proposed scheme
which in turn leads to a higher probability of a missed detection Pm. Also it
is clear that by increasing the pinging rate pr, the graphs tend to grow slower
and eventually reach some saturation levels, as higher values of pr force the
nodes to remain in higher states. This implies that in those saturated regions
no matter what the values of pr are, Ps has most of its mass in its highest
states. Therefore, the adversary has roughly the maximum time of about one
detection interval to succeed in its capture, thus causing a relatively constant
Pm regardless of pr.


















Figure 3.5: Probability of a missed detection Pm w.r.t. pr and M . The distance
between graphs shows exponential dependency of Pm v.s. M .
Using Eq. 3.19, we can get the expected residual time-to-false-alarm of
each node before any occurrence of false alarm. This measure tries to take into
account the average lifetime of any node in the network. Fig. 3.6 illustrates the
dependency of expected residual time-to-false-alarm Lf versus pr for different
values of the detection interval T , or a proportional number of states M . It
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shows that increasing pr improves the lifetime of each node. For example, for
M = 24 which corresponds to detection interval of 120 sec, by changing the
pinging rate from pr = 0.2 to pr = 0.4, we can increase the average residual
time-to-false-alarm of nodes from 2.8 hours to 278 hours. The results from
Eq. 3.9 and Fig. 3.4 imply that having a higher pinging rate maintains nodes
in higher states which in turn causes a longer lifetime before reaching state 0
and having a false alarm. Additionally, for any particular value of pr, increas-
ing the detection interval improves the residual time-to-false-alarm. Longer
detection interval provides more opportunity to receive a ping message and
sets the state back to M before reaching state 0. This in turn implies a longer
time-to-false-alarm or equivalently a smaller rate of reaching a false alarm.













Figure 3.6: Expected residual time-to-false-alarm Lf w.r.t. pr and M . Loga-
rithmic vertical axis shows the exponential dependency of Lf v.s. pr.
Fig. 3.7 shows the sensitivity of the residual time-to-false-alarm in terms
of pr. The left graph in this figure corresponds to a pr = 0.05 and the right
graph corresponds to a pr = 0.3 pinging rate. Recall that the pmf of Eq. 3.9
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gives the probability of being at state s, and hence it gives the probability
of having the residual time-to-false-alarm Ts given being in state s. In the
first case, the residual time-to-false-alarm takes nonzero probabilities over a
long range of states with a tendency towards higher states, each having their
corresponding residual time-to-false-alarms. While in the second case, the
majority of mass is concentrated around state M which prevents approaching
the lower states and increases the residual time-to-false-alarm of each state.
Note that in the second case, the order of the residual time-to-false-alarm is
















 = 0.05 
(a) Case 1: pr = 0.05















 = 0.3 
(b) Case 2: pr = 0.3
Figure 3.7: Sensitivity of Lf and Ts w.r.t. pr
Remark 2 The communication cost per node per epoch is prd message recep-
tions and transmissions. The computation cost per node per epoch is also prd
number of MAC 2 verifications, increments, and MAC generations. Also, the
scheme requires each node to keep a state counter for each neighbor resulting
in d registers per node.
2MAC refers to a Message Authentication Code procedure.
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Remark 3 If we have more than one adversary agent present at a time in a
specific neighborhood, we need to look at their cross effects on our scheme.
Considering one of the target nodes under the capture phase, the rest of the
neighbors are either legitimate, under the capture process, or already captured.
If they are legitimate, they will follow the scheme properly. If they are under
the capture phase, then they can not influence the adversary’s success on the
target node other than reducing the effective node degree deff of the target by
not participating in the scheme. Hence, we can consider each of the adversaries
independently. However, if they have already succeeded in capturing a node,
they may have a stronger impact on the scheme, a scenario which needs to
be investigated in more details. In this case, the scheme can not count on
the cooperation of the adversaries in any way. However, since the scheme is
designed based on pairwise interaction between the target node and each of its
neighbors, the influence of adversaries is only limited to reducing the effective
node degree. Further discussion regarding the impact of cooperations among
multiple adversary agents on the proposed scheme will be presented in details
in Chapter 4.
Remark 4 All neighbors of each node have to be able to initiate a ping mes-
sage. Given node degree d, we need to pick K such that K ≥ d. However,
in order to reduce the probability of collision among one hop neighbors, we
need to select K  d. Also another way to reduce collision is to reduce pr.
We should notice that reducing pr may not be desirable as it also affects the
performance of our pinging scheme.
Remark 5 The main performance measures in our scheme are Pm and Lf .
Looking at Fig. 3.5 shows strong sensitivity of Pm to M or T , while Fig. 3.6
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illustrates the exponential dependency of Lf to pr. Note that pr has a direct
relationship with the computation and communication costs of the scheme.
So having an efficient scheme requires us to keep pr as small as possible as
far as cost is concerned. These observations give us a trade-off in selecting
appropriate values for the parameters in order to meet the desired performance
objectives.
Remark 6 Given the required performance measures Pm and Lf , we can get
a design procedure for setting the appropriate parameters of the scheme. Note
that in WSN applications, the importance of Pm is higher than Lf because
of the fact that by not detecting a captured node we may be vulnerable to
severe malicious influence on the network traffic by the adversary. However, by
raising a false alarm for an innocent node we waste the available resources of a
network. Table 3.2 summarizes the steps to obtain the appropriate parameters
for the scheme. In this design scheme we simply solve for the best values
of pr and M iteratively. This leads to a sub-optimal solution of the design
parameters for meeting the desired performance.
Desired Pm and Lf are given.
d is defined by the deployed network topology.
Tp is set based on the round trip delay and the computational speed of nodes.
fX(x) or ηx are known a priori.
K is set with respect to d such that K  d.
Using Fig. 3.6 for the desired Lf , for each M we find min pr.
Using Fig. 3.5 for the desired Pm, for each M we find max pr.
Intersection of the above two regions for pr gives corresponding values for M and pr.
If there is no intersection, the design is not achievable by the desired Lf and Pm.
Set M to the lowest possible value.
For the selected value of M , pick min pr as the final value of pr.
Table 3.2: Summary of design procedure
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3.2 Quorum Pinging Scheme
As mentioned earlier, the pairwise pinging scheme is conducted based on a
pairwise interaction between any two neighbors. When a neighbor invokes
this scheme for a potential target node, it can raise a flag against the target
node. Then, this flag may be used as a basis for judging the status of the
target node from that neighbor’s viewpoint. Since any of the neighbors can
be captured by the adversary itself, or they might have a bad judgement
about the target node for any other reason, we can not rely solely on a single
raised flag as a basis for our revocation decision. Rather, we have to reach
a certain number of flags against the target node in order to conclude that
the target node has been captured and needs to be revoked. Otherwise, the
captured neighbor can maliciously run this scheme against its target node and
revoke that innocent neighbor. This leads to an increased false alarm rate
caused by the adversary, causing the detection process to backfire. In the
distributed revocation policy proposed in [17], q is the decision threshold for
the revocation of any target node. To exploit this observation in our scheme,
we need to generalize the pairwise pinging scheme to a q-node quorum pinging
scheme in which all the neighbors of the target node are engaged in a decision
making procedure in order to reach a consensus about the status of the target
node. Once the consensus regarding the captured status of the target node
is achieved, the result is spread across the network by those neighbors of the
target node which participated in the decision process and the network can
reliably revoke that captured node.
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3.2.1 Modeling of the Quorum Pinging Scheme
In order to maintain the self-organizing and distributed requirements discussed
earlier, we have to be very careful about the potential coordination among the
neighbors of the target node in the consensus based decision process. In the
proposed quorum pinging scheme, each node keeps a counter corresponding to
each of its one-hop neighbors. While running the pairwise pinging scheme be-
tween each pair of neighbors independently, the issuer of a potential flag raised
against a target node broadcasts its flag in its own neighborhood. Then, some
of the target’s neighbors would receive that flag and increment the counter
associated with that particular target node. Once the number of collected
flags, or equivalently the level of the target node’s counter kept by its neigh-
bors, reaches the required threshold q, the neighbors take that as a consensus
among at least q neighbors of the target node in their common neighborhood
that the target node has been captured. Then, all those participating neigh-
bors in the quorum issue a revocation flag against the target node and spread
the revocation flag across the network. After that, it is up to the deployed
revocation mechanism as to how to revoke that captured node’s ID across the
network.
Note that the required coordination among at least q neighbors of tar-
get nodes are aligned with the distributed and self-organizing properties of
our interest. The execution of the pairwise pinging scheme and the genera-
tion of each raised flag is independent of the other neighbors of their common
target node. Also, the counter update of the target node is done individually
in each neighbor and it is quite possible that some neighbors have different
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values in their own counter corresponding to the particular target node. This
can happen if some neighbors do not hear the flag broadcasted by another
neighbor of the target node for various reasons such as packet loss, collision,
out of communication range between two neighbors of the target node, etc.
The coordination for aggregate flags has to be performed in a timely
manner such that all the required q flags against the target node to be revoked
need to occur before the adversary can complete its capture process of the
target node. This is done by assigning a lifetime period for each flag raised by
a neighbor. The lifetime of each flag is equal to the detection interval T which
was defined earlier in the pairwise pinging scheme section. The reason for such
a choice for the lifetime duration of each flag lies on the following premise. In
order to reach a consensus among all q participating neighbors regarding the
captured status of a target node in their common neighborhood, all the flags
have to be raised within a time duration of length T . This is because of the fact
that each neighbor runs their own Markov Chain corresponding to the target
node and each can be in one of the states between 1 to M . Once one neighbor
raises a flag against the target node, it means that its state is 0 at the current
time. For other neighbors in order to support this flag or not by their own
judgement about the target node, it takes at most MTe or equivalently T unit
of time to reach the same assessment about the target node. In other words,
if some other neighbor is in state s at current time, it takes sTe unit of time to
reach state 0 which corresponds to its own raised flag. Note that because the
objective of the pinging scheme is to detect the presence of an adversary on a
target node, once the adversary is physically present on the target node then
the effect of its presence would be observable by all the neighbors. This would
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result in the occurrence of dependent events on all the neighbors of the target
node. As a result, the flags from the rest of the neighbors would be raised with
at most a lag of T units of time. The beauty of this setting is that even though
the interactions of each neighbor with the target node are independent from
each other, the desirable event of interest, namely the captured status of the
target node, would be dependent upon the observations among its neighbors.
This property allows us to expect the same reaction from all the neighbors
within a certain time duration of length T .
Thus, each node has a counter corresponding to each of its neighbors
and once a flag against a target node is raised by itself or another neighbor of
the target node which is broadcasted by the initial neighbor, that counter will
be incremented. Now if at any point in time the value of the counter reaches
the threshold q, all the neighbors which have issued those q flags commit to
a revocation flag and broadcast it across the network. Then, depending on
the deployed revocation policy the network initiates the revocation procedure
of the target node which is now identified by those q neighbors as captured
by an adversary. The other possibility is that the counter does not reach the
threshold q after T units of time from the time that the first flag was issued.
This means that the judgement about the target node is not supported by
enough of its neighbors watching it. At that time the first issued flag would
be expired and therefore, the counter would be decremented once. This issue
could be repeated for the other flags if they are not supported by at least
q − 1 other successive flags. Note that upon the expiration of any flag, the
corresponding Markov Chain would reset back to its original state M and the
execution of the pairwise pinging scheme between the neighbor which issued
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the expired flag and the target node starts over.
Clearly, if we were to observe the counter level over time, it would look
like a queue which goes up and down one step at a time upon the arrival or
expiration of each flag until the time that the counter either hits the zero level
or reaches the level q. If it returns to zero, then the scenario repeats itself
and the scheme waits for the next raised flag. On the other hand, once the
counter reaches the level q, a revocation flag will be issued and broadcasted
across the network. Consequently, the network will revoke the target node
and all the neighbors of that captured node would cease to monitor it. So, it
should be clear that upon reaching the level q, the queue associated with the
captured node no longer exists. Fig. 3.8 depicts two possible sample paths of
such queue. Note that it is quite possible that the queue fills to some level
less than q and empties out until it reaches level q or may never reach level q,
however reaching level q can occur at most once. This implies that over time
the queue may go through sample paths similar to the left graph in Fig. 3.8
several times while it can go through the right graph only once. Note that T ∗(i)
denotes the ordered statistics of the arrival time of the ith flag raised by one































(b) Case 2: The counter reaches the threshold level and a revocation flag is raised
Figure 3.8: Queue sample paths for the quorum size q = 4
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This queue can be modeled as G/G/1/q based on Kendall’s notation.As
there is not a closed form analytical solution for this queue model, we try to
find an approximation model in order to evaluate the desired metrics of this
queue.
Similar to the pairwise pinging scheme, we are interested in finding the
expected residual time-to-false-alarm L
(q)
f , and the probability of a missed de-
tection P
(q)
m for the q-node quorum pinging scheme.
Contrary to the pairwise pinging scheme, a single raised flag against
the target node would not be interpreted as an assessment for the captured
status of the target node. Instead, we have to have at least q supporting flags
within a time duration of length T raised by the target node’s neighbors in
order to reach a consensus that the target node is really captured and needs
to be revoked. This would define the underlying emergent property [46] of the
quorum pinging scheme in which a significant gain in performance of captured
node detection is viable in exchange of reasonable cost only through the col-
lective actions of multiple nodes, namely the neighbors of any target node.
A. Probability of a Missed Detection. Increasing the quorum size q
means involving more neighbors in the decision making process regarding the
status of the target node, although this leads to a slower decision procedure.
We will consider this effect on missed detection and false alarm events and com-
pare those with their counterparts in the pairwise pinging scheme in which q
is basically set to 1.
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A missed detection event in this case occurs when the target node is
being captured by the adversary and there are at most q − 1 neighbors which
witness this event and raise flags against that target node. Therefore, in such
circumstances consensus cannot be achieved by the neighbors and the raised
flags would expire one after the other. Mistakenly, the overall judgement of
the neighbors is that the target node is still legitimate and not captured. In-
tuitively, increasing the quorum size q should lead to a higher probability of a
missed detection. This is because given the target node is under the capture
process, the scheme requires more neighbors to raise flags against the target
node in order to detect the presence of an adversary on it. By increasing q,
the occurrence of this consensus becomes more unlikely and there is a greater
chance of missing a captured node, which in turn leads to a higher proba-
bility of a missed detection. We will investigate the validity of our intuition
through our performance evaluations using different values of the quorum size
q in order to compare its effects on the probability of a missed detection in the
quorum pinging scheme.
In order to determine the probability of a missed detection for the quo-
rum pinging scheme P
(q)
m , given that the target node is captured, a missed
detection event can happen only if at least d − q + 1 neighbors miss the com-
mon target node and consider it as a legitimate one even though the target
node is actually under capture by an adversary. This is equivalent to saying
that at most q − 1 neighbors detect the target node as a captured node if the
node is really under capture. Thus, the probability of a missed detection in



































P d−q+im (1 − Pm)
q−i corresponds number of possibilities
that q− i out of d neighbors of the target node detect the target node as under
capture and the remaining neighbors miss that event.
B. Expected Residual Time-to-false-alarm. In this step, we try to ana-
lyze the behavior of the quorum pinging scheme with respect to false alarms.
Here we consider the event in which, given the target node is not captured, the
overall decision of the scheme is that the target node is marked as captured.
This false alarm event can happen only if at least q neighbors identify the
target node as captured in error and raise flags against it. To proceed with
this consensus successfully, all these flags have to be raised within the time
duration of length T from each other otherwise some of the flags may expire. If
this happens, then a revocation flag will be mistakenly issued by the neighbors
to revoke the target node permanently.
Similar to the pairwise pinging scheme, we are interested in finding the
average time it takes for at least q neighbors of a legitimate target node to
reach a consensus about it and identify it as a captured node, which is called
the expected residual time-to-false-alarm L
(q)
f . Again our intuition tells us
that increasing quorum size q in a false alarm event should lead to a lesser
likelihood of false alarms or, equivalently, a longer time-to-false-alarm. This
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is because by including more neighbors in the decision process, it would be
harder for them to reach a consensus about the captured status of the legiti-
mate target node. Note that not reaching a consensus in any situation means
that the participating neighbors cannot declare the target node as captured.
This in turn means that the target node will be treated normally as a legiti-
mate one regardless of its actual status. Therefore, the only possible decision
resulting from our detection mechanisms, either the pairwise or quorum ping-
ing schemes, is to declare the target node under investigation as captured.
Otherwise, the implication of not reaching a final decision is that the target
node is legitimate and should be treated normally as other legitimate nodes
of the network.
As pointed out earlier, in order to model the time-to-false-alarm metric,
we need to solve the G/G/1/q queue analytically. To get around this step,
we propose an approximation approach in order to evaluate the time-to-false-
alarm and to get a sense of performance evaluation in the case of false alarms.
To do so, we recall the way the quorum scheme is executed. As each neighbor
of a target node performs a separate pairwise pinging scheme with the target
node independently, the time it takes for each of them to reach a false alarm
flag against the target node is on average Lf . In the case of generating a false
alarm in the quorum scheme, at least q flags need to be raised by the neighbors
of a legitimate target node within a time duration of length T . So, if one of
the flags takes about Lf sec, the rest of the flags need to be raised within time





f ≤ Lf + T (3.23)
Considering the nominal values of the quantities in Eq. 3.23, we can
impose the Sandwich theorem in order to approximate the value of the ex-
pected residual time-to-false-alarm in the quorum pinging scheme L
(q)
f . For all
practical applications, the value of T is much less than Lf , i.e., Lf  T which
results in a tight bound in Eq. 3.23 and can be derived as:
liminf L
(q)
f = Lf = E[Ts] (3.24)
Hence, the expected residual time-to-false-alarm in the quorum pinging
scheme L
(q)
f can be well approximated for our practical purposes by:
L
(q)




(i) ≤ T (3.25)
Recall that T ∗(i) is the ordered statistics of the arrival time of the i
th flag
raised by one of the neighbors of the target node. In this case, the ith flag is
the first flag of the first batch of q flags within time T . Here these flags are
sorted based on the order they are raised in time regardless of which neighbors
have issued them.
Considering Eq. 3.25 seems to suggest that as far as false alarm is
concerned, we do not experience any gain from the quorum scheme compared
to its pairwise counterpart. However, the result in Eq. 3.25 is subject to the
condition that the consensus among q neighbors is achievable. In order to
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achieve the above conditional expectation, we have to find the probability of
occurrence of false alarm among at least q neighbors of a target node. This
probability can be evaluated based on the state values of the target node
kept in its neighbors. Reaching a consensus about the captured status of a
legitimate node leads to raise a false alarm against the target node. To do
so, all the q flags have to be raised within time T of each other. Note that in
a false alarm case, the target node is legitimate and as opposed to a missed
detection case, the observable event of the target node for its neighbors are
independent from each other. This results in independent behavior among
all the neighbors. Some may react correctly and judge the target node as
legitimate and some may mistakenly reach to a conclusion that the target
node is under capture. In the latter case, those neighbors have reached state
0 of the Markov Chain corresponding to the target node. For those neighbors
who reside in lower values of state for the target node and raise a false alarm
flag against the target node, it takes them less time to do so. These times
are already evaluated based on the pairwise interactions of each neighbor with
the target node in Eq. 3.16 and denoted as Ts. As each neighbor runs a
similar Markov Chain with the same parameters for a common target node,
the solutions of Ts would be the same among those neighbors. However, each
neighbor can possesses different state values corresponding to the same target
node at any given point in time. Now, in order to evaluate the probability
of a false-alarm in the quorum pinging scheme, we have to add all possible
q-tuples masses in which their corresponding Ts are within the time duration
of length T . Therefore, we need to construct a sliding window of length T and
move it along the values of Ts. Then for those states with proper Ts, find their
collective mass and sum these collective masses for all possible options. This
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quantity would result in the probability of a false-alarm in the quorum pinging
scheme which is denoted as P
(q)
F.A.. In the following section, we will evaluate
this quantity and along with the expected residual time-to-false-alarm in the
quorum pinging scheme L
(q)
f derived in Eq. 3.25, we will be able to conclude
the gain that we can achieve using the quorum pinging scheme compared to its
pairwise counterpart. Note that in the pairwise case, there is not any consensus
requirements and the judgement about the target node is solely raised by each
neighbor of the target node. Thus, the occurrences of false alarms are only
dependent upon each neighbor and the expected residual time-to-false-alarm
Lf will almost surely be achieved.
Assumption 11 Quorum size q is smaller than the number of legitimate
neighbors of any target node, known as the effective node degree deff (i.e.,
q ≤ deff).
Assumption 12 We have a low probability of collision among ping messages
and responses due to the short duration of messages with respect to bit rate.
3.2.2 Performance Evaluation
To compare the performance of the pairwise and quorum pinging schemes, we
present several numerical examples in this section. In each of these examples,
we try to see the effects that different parameters have on the performance
of the two proposed schemes. We also will investigate the validity of our in-
tuitions about the behavior of the schemes with respect to various parameters.
The examples are presented in four different scenarios. The first scenario
corresponds to the nominal range of parameters and all three other scenarios
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are compared against the first one in order to show the effect of various pa-
rameters on the performance of our proposed schemes.





Te = 5 sec
ηx = 400 sec
(3.26)
The typical design objectives for time-to-false-alarm and the probability
of a missed detection in a WSN application is considered in this scenario.
Here we need to meet around 116 days of time-to-false-alarm and 0.20 missed
detection rate as our objective performance measures.
Pm ≤ 0.2
Lf ≥ 10
7 sec ≈ 116 days
(3.27)
Following the results depicted in Fig. 3.9 leads us to have 48 states and





Selecting the parameters in Eq. 3.28 satisfies the inequalities in Eq. 3.27
and leads to a 0.12 probability of a missed detection precisely, i.e., Pm = 0.12.
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(a) Probability of a missed detection Pm
w.r.t. pr and M .






















(b) Expected residual time-to-false-alarm
Lf w.r.t. pr and M .
Figure 3.9: Relevant graphs to design pairwise pinging scheme parameters for
Scenario 1.
Now, we use the q-node quorum pinging scheme to show the perfor-
mance gain that we can achieve. By imposing the quorum scheme with the
corresponding parameters derived in Eq. 3.28 from the pairwise scheme, we
use Eq. 3.22 to evaluate the effective probability of a missed detection for this
scheme P
(q)
m . Fig. 3.10 shows the value of P
(q)
m for different values of q. The
left graph is the actual values of P
(q)
m for corresponding q and the right graph
is the logarithmic values of P
(q)
m to show a better picture for smaller values of q.
Observe that for the pairwise case the value of P
(q)
m is constant regard-
less of q and it is equal to the original Pm. This is because in the pairwise case
q is effectively equal to 1 and the evaluated Pm in that case is the probability
of a missed detection for any potential neighbor of the target node. To explain
why the value of P
(q)
m corresponding to q = 1 in quorum pinging is not equal
to the case of pairwise pinging, we have to consider the following. As opposed
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(a) Actual value of P
(q)
m versus q.



















(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
m versus q.
Figure 3.10: Probability of a missed detection for the q-node quorum pinging
scheme w.r.t. the one in the pairwise pinging scheme for various quorum size
q.
to the pairwise case, in the quorum scheme there is a race among at least q
out of d neighbors of each target node to reach a consensus based judgement
(in order to constitute a quorum) regarding its captured status. For q = 1
and given that the target node is really under the capture process, it can be
detected as captured if at least one of its neighbors detects the adversary’s
presence on that node. So, the only way a missed detection event can happen
is that no neighbor detects the captured status of the target node. Clearly,
the occurrence of such events are very unlikely compared to the case of the
pairwise scheme in which the probability of a missed detection is evaluated
for any potential neighbor of the target node and it has an average sense of
a missed detection event. Thus the probability of a missed detection for the
latter case will be higher.




to q, we can consider the following case. Following the argument given above,
consider the case in which q = 5 and d = 20. Given that the target node is
under capture, a consensus for detecting its captured status can be achieved
if at least 5 of its neighbors detect that event. This means that if there are
4 or less neighbors which detect that event, then the consensus cannot occur
and the scheme will miss it. This implies that we can have more possibilities
which lead to a missed detection event compared to the case of q = 1. This
argument shows the reason for increasing the trend of P
(q)
m with respect to q.
As a result, increasing the quorum size q would not be helpful as far as the
missed detection rate is concerned and we prefer to keep q as low as possible.
Note that as Fig. 3.10 shows, we have some gain in the probability of a missed
detection for the cases in which q ≤ 16 and in particular for q ≤ 13, this
measure is reasonably negligible.
To evaluate the projected gain for the false alarm rate in the quorum
scheme, we refer to Eq. 3.25 which shows a similar expected residual time-
to-false-alarm compared to the pairwise case, except its precondition factor.
As discussed earlier, the occurrence of a false alarm is expected to be roughly
around Lf almost surely. While in the quorum scheme, the false alarm event is
achieved subject to the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A.. In order to calculate
this metric, we need to determine the distribution of the residual time-to-
false-alarm given in any state, Ts in the underlying pairwise scheme and the
corresponding pmf Ps. These quantities are derived from Eqs. 3.16 and 3.9,
respectively. Fig. 3.11 shows the residual time-to-false-alarm Ts given in state
s for the corresponding pairwise case with the parameters described in Eq.
3.26.
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Figure 3.11: Residual time-to-false-alarm Ts given in state s in Scenario 1.
Using the above values of Ts and finding their appropriate q-tuples with
respect to T , we can find the possible q-tuples masses and find their sum to
get the probability of false alarm denoted by P
(q)
F.A.. Fig. 3.12 depicts this
quantity. Again, for clarification we put the actual values on the left graph
and the logarithmic values on the right graph to get a sense of its reduction
rate with respect to q.
Similar to our argument on the missed detection case, we will explain
the trend of this graph for the quorum scheme and its comparison with its
pairwise counterpart. In the case of false alarm events, the precondition is
that the target node is legitimate and not captured while the neighbors reach
a consensus regarding the captured status of the target node. Now, consider
the quorum scheme for which the quorum size q is set to 1 and there are 20
neighbors in each target node’s communication range. In this case, if at least
1 out of 20 neighbors of the target node raise a flag against the target node,
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(a) Actual value of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.

















(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.
Figure 3.12: Probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. for quorum pinging scheme with
various quorum size q.
the consensus will be achieved and the revocation flag will be raised by the
participating neighbors in the quorum. This would cause a false alarm and
lead to the revocation of the legitimate target node by mistake. The only way
to skip false alarms in this scenario is for all 20 neighbors not to raise a flag
against the target node which is actually the correct thing for them to do. In
contrast, if we set q to be 5 then for reaching a consensus among the neigh-
bors, the scheme is at least required to collect 5 flags out of 20 neighbors. If
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there is less than or equal to 4 neighbors which raised flags against the target
node, the consensus cannot be achieved and the false alarm does not occur.
Comparing the latter case with the former one, we can easily see that by in-
creasing q, the chances for false alarm events will be reduced, which is exactly
the same observations we get from Fig. 3.12. So, as far as the false alarm
rate is concerned we need to have higher values of the quorum size q in order
to get a lower probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A.. The benefit of imposing the
quorum scheme with respect to false alarms is significant once we have q ≥ 4
in this example. Note that in the right graph of Fig. 3.12, the reduction in
the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. has a linear trend, which seems to suggest
that its actual value decreases exponentially by increasing q.
Overall, the achieved gain of using the quorum scheme as opposed to
the initial pairwise pinging scheme is governed by our proper choice of the
quorum size q which is 4 ≤ q ≤ 13 in this example. This selection of q would
lead to a negligible probability of a missed detection and also a negligible prob-
ability of false alarm even though the conditional residual time-to-false-alarm
remains in the same order as the one in its pairwise counterpart. Eventually,
in the limit sense when the probability of false alarm tends toward zero, we
can interpret that as if the residual time-to-false-alarm approaches infinity.
Scenario 2. In this example we try to discover the effects of weak
physical protection of the nodes, weak obfuscation techniques, and a high
skill level of the adversary in capturing a target node in a WSN. All these
circumstances would lead to a shorter time for the adversary to complete the
capture process of a target node. Compared to Scenario 1, when the adversary
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completes its capture faster, it is intuitively obvious that the scheme needs
to work harder to combat the adversary. The immediate influence of such
circumstances on the parameters of our scheme is on the reduced value of
ηx. Here we consider an adversary which is capable of completing the capture
process of its target node on average 4 times faster than the one of Scenario
1. In summary, the parameters of the underlying pairwise pinging scheme for




Te = 5 sec
ηx = 100 sec
(3.29)
Using the same performance requirements as in Scenario 1 in terms of
the time-to-false-alarm and probability of a missed detection would not lead
to any result in the pairwise pinging scheme under the current parameters in
Eq. 3.29. Therefore, in order to get a feasible result, we relax the desired
performance requirements and expect to have a possible outcome from the




4 sec ≈ 2.8 hours
(3.30)
Following the results depicted in Fig. 3.13 leads us to have 56 states
and a 0.37 pinging rate for the proposed pairwise pinging scheme which is


























(a) Probability of a missed detection Pm
w.r.t. pr and M .






















(b) Expected residual time-to-false-alarm
Lf w.r.t. pr and M .
Figure 3.13: Relevant graphs to design the pairwise pinging scheme parameters
for Scenario 2.
Selecting the parameters in Eq. 3.31 satisfies the inequalities in Eq.
3.30 and leads to a 0.23 probability of a missed detection, i.e., Pm = 0.23.
Note that even though we have relaxed the performance objectives sig-
nificantly compared to the ones in Scenario 1, we still have to have more states
and ping more often. The reason for this extra cost comes from the fact that
the adversary in this case gets faster and the detection scheme has to spend
relatively more energy combating the adversary.
Again imposing the q-node quorum pinging scheme with the correspond-
ing parameters for its underlying pairwise scheme derived from Eq. 3.31 shows
the significant gain compared to the pairwise case.
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Fig. 3.14 shows the value of P
(q)
m for different values of the quorum size
q. The left graph is the actual values of P
(q)
m for the corresponding value of q
and the right graph is the logarithmic values of P
(q)
m to show a better picture
for the smaller values of q. Similar to the discussion given in Scenario 1, we
have the same trend of increasing P
(q)
m by increasing the quorum size q. Note
that as Fig. 3.14 shows, we have some gain in the probability of a missed
detection for the cases in which q ≤ 14 and in particular for q ≤ 10, this
measure is reasonably negligible.


















(a) Actual value of P
(q)
m versus q.
















(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
m versus q.
Figure 3.14: Probability of a missed detection for q-node quorum pinging
scheme w.r.t. the one in the pairwise pinging scheme for various quorum size
q.
To demonstrate the projected gain for the false alarm rate in the quo-
rum scheme, we try to find the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. based on the
same argument in Scenario 1. To do so, we need to have the distribution of the
residual time-to-false-alarm for any state, Ts in the underlying pairwise scheme
and their corresponding pmf Ps. Again, these quantities are derived from Eqs.
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3.16 and 3.9, respectively. Fig. 3.15 depicts the residual time-to-false-alarm
Ts given in state s for the corresponding pairwise case with the parameters
described in Eq. 3.29.













Figure 3.15: Residual time-to-false-alarm Ts given in state s in Scenario 2.
Fig. 3.16 illustrates the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A.. Again, for clar-
ification we put the actual values on the left graph and the logarithmic values
on the right graph to get a sense of its reduction rate with respect to q.
Again the achieved gain with respect to false alarm is significant once
we have q ≥ 5 in this example. Therefore, the gain of using the quorum scheme
as opposed to the initial pairwise pinging scheme is governed by our proper
choice of the quorum size q which is 5 ≤ q ≤ 10 in this example in order to get
a negligible probability of a missed detection and also a negligible probability
of false alarm.
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(a) Actual value of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.



















(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.
Figure 3.16: Probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. for quorum pinging scheme with
various quorum size q.
Scenario 3. In this example we try to discover the effects of enhanced
physical protection of nodes, strong obfuscation techniques, or low skill level
of an adversary in capturing a target node in a WSN. All these circumstances
would lead to a longer time for the adversary to complete its capture process
on a target node.
Compared to Scenario 1, when the adversary takes longer to complete
its capture, we expect that the situation would be easier for combating the
adversary. The immediate influence of such circumstances on the parameters
of our scheme is on the increased value of ηx. Here we consider an adversary
which is capable of completing the capture process of its target node on average
4 times slower than the one of Scenario 1. In summary, the parameters of the





Te = 5 sec
ηx = 800 sec
(3.32)
Here we consider the same performance requirements as in Scenario 1
in terms of the time-to-false-alarm and the probability of a missed detection.
Pm ≤ 0.2
Lf ≥ 10
7 sec ≈ 116 days
(3.33)
Following the results depicted in Fig. 3.17 leads to 48 states and a 0.17





Selecting the parameters in Eq. 3.34 meets the inequalities in Eq. 3.33
and leads to a 0.18 probability of a missed detection precisely, i.e., Pm = 0.18.
This result shows that the pairwise scheme needs to spend less energy in com-
bating the slower adversary compared to the one in Scenario 1.
Imposing the q-node quorum pinging scheme with the corresponding
parameters for its underlying pairwise scheme derived from Eq. 3.34 shows
the significant gain compared to the pairwise case.
Fig. 3.18 shows the value of P
(q)
m for different values of quorum size q.
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(a) Probability of a missed detection Pm
w.r.t. pr and M .
















(b) Expected residual time-to-false-alarm
Lf w.r.t. pr and M .
Figure 3.17: Relevant graphs to design pairwise pinging scheme parameters
for Scenario 3.
The left graph is the actual values of P
(q)
m for corresponding q and the right
graph is the logarithmic values of P
(q)
m to show a better picture for smaller
values of q. Similar to the discussion given in Scenario 1, we have the same
trend of increasing P
(q)
m by increasing quorum size q. Note that as Fig. 3.18
shows, we have some gain in the probability of a missed detection for the cases
in which q ≤ 15 and in particular for q ≤ 11, this measure is reasonably neg-
ligible.
To demonstrate the projected gain for the false alarm rate in the quo-
rum scheme, we try to find the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. based on the
same argument in Scenario 1. To do so, we need to have the distribution of
residual time-to-false-alarm given in any states Ts in the underlying pairwise
scheme and their corresponding pmf Ps. Again, these quantities are derived
from Eqs. 3.16 and 3.9, respectively. Fig. 3.19 depicts the residual time-to-
false-alarm Ts given in state s for the corresponding pairwise case with the
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(a) Actual value of P
(q)
m versus q.












(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
m versus q.
Figure 3.18: Probability of a missed detection for q-node quorum pinging
scheme w.r.t. the one in the pairwise pinging scheme for various quorum size
q.
parameters described in Eq. 3.32.
Fig. 3.20 illustrates the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A.. Again, for clar-
ification we put the actual values on the left graph and the logarithmic values
on the right graph to get a sense of its reduction rate with respect to q.
Again the achieved gain with respect to false alarm is significant once
we have q ≥ 3 in this example. Therefore, the gain of using the quorum
scheme as opposed to the initial pairwise pinging scheme is governed by our
proper choice of the quorum size q, which is 3 ≤ q ≤ 11 in this example, in
order to get a negligible probability of a missed detection and also a negligible
probability of false alarm.
Scenario 4. Now we try to investigate the cost-performance trade-offs of
the pairwise pinging scheme and performance compensation using the quorum
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Figure 3.19: Residual time-to-false-alarm Ts given in state s in Scenario 3.
pinging scheme. It is clear that by relaxing the performance objectives, we
can reduce the costs associated with the pairwise pinging scheme in order to
meet those requirements. To show this issue, we set the same parameters for




Te = 5 sec
ηx = 400 sec
(3.35)
Instead we have relaxed the performance measures including the proba-
bility of a missed detection and expected residual time-to-false-alarm compared
to the ones in Scenario 1 as follows:
Pm ≤ 0.25
Lf ≥ 10
4 sec ≈ 2.8 hours
(3.36)
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(a) Actual value of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.


















(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.
Figure 3.20: Probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. for the quorum pinging scheme
with various quorum size q.
Following the results depicted in Fig. 3.21 leads to 56 states and a 0.09





Selecting the parameters in Eq. 3.37 meets the inequalities in Eq. 3.36
and leads to a 0.21 probability of a missed detection, i.e., Pm = 0.21. Observe
that by relaxing the performance measures, we have gained significant cost
reduction associated with the pairwise pinging scheme. This is because while
the required number of states is increased from 48 to 56, the pinging rate is
dropped from 0.23 to 0.09. Note that the majority of cost is directly associated
with the required pinging rate pr.
Again imposing the q-node quorum pinging scheme with the correspond-
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(a) Probability of a missed detection Pm
w.r.t. pr and M .






















(b) Expected residual time-to-false-alarm
Lf w.r.t. pr and M .
Figure 3.21: Relevant graphs to design pairwise pinging scheme parameters
for Scenario 4.
ing parameters for its underlying pairwise scheme derived from Eq. 3.37 shows
the significant gain compared to the pairwise case.
Fig. 3.22 shows the value of P
(q)
m for different values of quorum size q.
The left graph is the actual values of P
(q)
m for its corresponding q and the right
graph is the logarithmic values of P
(q)
m to show a better picture for smaller val-
ues of q. Similar to the discussion given in Scenario 1, we see the same trend of
increasing P
(q)
m by increasing quorum size q. Note that as Fig. 3.22 shows, we
have some gain in the probability of a missed detection for the cases in which
q ≤ 14 and in particular for q ≤ 10, this measure is reasonably negligible.
To demonstrate the projected gain for the false alarm rate in the quo-
rum scheme, we try to find the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. based on the
same argument in Scenario 1. To do so, we need to have the distribution of the
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(a) Actual value of P
(q)
m versus q.
















(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
m versus q.
Figure 3.22: Probability of a missed detection for the q-node quorum pinging
scheme w.r.t. the one in the pairwise pinging scheme for various quorum size
q.
residual time-to-false-alarm given in any state, Ts in the underlying pairwise
scheme and their corresponding pmf Ps. Again, these quantities are derived
from Eqs. 3.16 and 3.9, respectively. Fig. 3.23 depicts the residual time-to-
false-alarm Ts given in state s for the corresponding pairwise case with the
parameters described in Eq. 3.35.
Fig. 3.24 illustrates the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A.. Again, for clar-
ification we put the actual values on the left graph and the logarithmic values
on the right graph to get a sense of its reduction rate with respect to q.
Again the achieved gain with respect to false alarm is significant once
we have q ≥ 3 in this example. Therefore, the gain of using the quorum
scheme as opposed to the initial pairwise pinging scheme is governed by our
proper choice of the quorum size q, which is 3 ≤ q ≤ 10 in this example, in
order to get a negligible probability of a missed detection and also a negligible
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Figure 3.23: Residual time-to-false-alarm Ts given in state s in Scenario 4.
probability of false alarm.
As a result, we see that by relaxing the performance measures for the
initial pairwise pinging scheme, we could save significantly in costs. While
using the proper quorum size q in the quorum scheme, we could improve the
overall performance measures including the probability of a missed detection
P
(q)
m and the probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A..
Remark 7 It is quite interesting to note that among all these different sce-
narios the required quorum size q is in the same relative range in order to
meet the desired performance measures such as overall probability of a missed
detection P
(q)
m and probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A.. This quorum size is pro-
portional to the average node degree d of the network. As a rule of thumb
we can pick q to be 0.25 d. This selection of q implies that we need about 25
percent of a node’s neighbors reaching the same judgement about a suspicious
node in order to have a reliable consensus in a quorum.
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(a) Actual value of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.















(b) Logarithm of P
(q)
F.A. versus q.
Figure 3.24: Probability of false alarm P
(q)
F.A. for the quorum pinging scheme
for various quorum sizes q.
3.3 Cost Analysis
In this section, we address the costs imposed by the proposed schemes. These
costs include communication, computation, and memory requirements of the
corresponding schemes. Note that the parameter selections associated with
each scheme is done offline and there is no need for the network nodes to per-
form the design procedures of the proposed protocols.
First, we consider the pairwise pinging scheme which can be run be-
tween each pair of neighbors independently. To perform this scheme, each
node has to run a separate Markov Chain for each of its neighbors. This re-
quires a ping message exchange between each pair within each epoch with the
pinging probability pr. This leads to a communication cost of prd/Te messages
per sec. For each Markov Chain run against each neighbor of a node, the node
has to keep a state counter associated with each neighbor resulting in d reg-
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isters per node. Computation costs include a random variable generation per
epoch, MAC generations and verifications. Within each epoch, a node has to
generate a uniform random variable between [0, 1] interval and compares it
with pr in order to decide whether it wants to ping its neighbors in the current
epoch or not. Moreover, each node needs to generate d ping messages for all
its neighbors with probability pr within each epoch which includes d number
of MAC generations. On the other hand, once the node decides to ping its
neighbors it expects to receive the responses for all sent ping messages within
the current epoch. However, it may or may not receive all the expected ping
responses depending on the status of each neighbor. At most, it has to ver-
ify d number of MACs in the pinging response messages. It is worth noting
here that attackers cannot launch bogus responses to deplete the resources of
the node due to the fact that the node only verifies those responses which it
initiates itself in the appropriate intervals of the current epoch. Here we put
more loads from the scheme in the computational segments in exchange for
reducing the required communication costs as the communication costs are
more restrictive than computational ones.
Secondly, the costs of the q-node quorum pinging scheme are as follows.
In this case even though each node runs an independent pairwise pinging
scheme with each of its neighbor, the results of its judgements and the judge-
ments of the other nodes in the neighborhood regarding their neighbors are
recorded in counter registers dedicated for each of their neighbors and kept
on each individual node. Once a node reaches a judgement about one of its
neighbors, namely that, from its own perspective its neighbor has been cap-
tured, it raises a flag and broadcasts it to the neighborhood. Those neighbors
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which receive this flag would increment the counter register associated with
the target node. Each flag has a lifetime of T . In each of the neighbors of the
target node, each flag is kept for its own lifetime interval and if the counter
reaches the quorum size q, the neighbors that experience this event raise a
revocation flag and commit to that flag and broadcast it across the network.
Otherwise, once each flag is expired, each neighbor individually decrements the
counter of the target node based on its own clock. The interesting property of
the proposed quorum scheme lies in the following observation. Compared to
the pairwise case, this scheme does not impose any additional communication
costs other than the occasional broadcasting of the raised flags. Instead, we
can get significant gains in performance compared to the pairwise scheme with
the same parameters using emergent properties in the neighborhoods. Note
that as far as cost is concerned, the communication costs are the dominant
prohibitive factors in WSN applications. Here, we have more or less the same
communication costs and relatively small computation costs for keeping track
of raised and expired flags and the counter registers. To give a rough idea of
the overall costs in a practical setting, we present the required costs for the
case presented in Scenario 1. The quorum scheme imposes the communication
load of about 0.92 messages per node per second and 40 registers per node for
storing the state values and counters for its neighbors.
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Chapter 4
Capture Strategies by Adversary’s
Agents
In contrast to the attack scenarios discussed in the previous chapter, which
was launched by the adversary, here we consider the case in which the adver-
sary deploys multiple agents in the network in order to capture as many active
network nodes as possible. In the previous chapter the main objective was to
detect the presence of a single adversary agent which is trying to capture a
network node. This task can be performed by the participation of, at least
one, and up to q neighbors of the target node under capture, as we seen before,
by engaging into a particular variation of a so called pinging scheme. Now,
we try to generalize our model in the sense that the adversary has multiple
agents in hand and is able to target various network nodes using those agents.
In order for the adversary to gain a better capture result, namely more
captured nodes, it has to use a specific strategy to distribute its agents against
93
the network. An ideal strategy is the one which guarantees that with a fixed
number of agents, the adversary can capture the maximum possible number
of nodes. So, the goal is to achieve the optimal capture strategy for adversary
agents. This objective requires various classifications of capture strategies;
including random versus targeted distribution of agents, and the order the
network nodes should be captured (e.g., sequential, random, or simultane-
ously).
Definition 8 Collusion is communication among adversary agents which
preside over targets under capture or over already captured targets.
The act of collusion includes any exchange of information among agents
for the purpose of defeating the underlying pinging scheme. The ultimate goal
of collusion is to capture more nodes successively through additional adver-
sary’s agents using the harvested information from colluders. The communi-
cation can be performed via hybrid channels as agents are physically present
on the target nodes and have access to their own resources as well. Due to the
way that the q-node quorum pinging scheme is set up, once an agent targets a
specific node and starts to capture it, it can broadcast this event to the rest of
the agents through those communication links. This exchange of information is
called collusion, which can potentially improve the adversary’s capture results.
We shall investigate whether agent collusion yields better capture results
(i.e., more nodes) than independent, random capture. We will analyze our
model and characterize the countermeasures that are necessary for addressing
the adversary’s strategies defined earlier.
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4.1 Capture Strategy for Specific Targets
4.1.1 Modeling of Capture Strategy for Specific Targets
In this trivial case, the objective of each adversary’s agent is to maximize the
probability of success for capturing a specific target node. Obviously without
loss of generality and for the sake of brevity, we will only analyze the single
specific target case here.
The adversary’s success to capture a target node is equivalent to missing
a capture event in the underlying q-node quorum pinging scheme. Therefore,





denotes the number of collaborative agents accompanying the j th adversary’s
agent. NA represents the total number of adversary agents which can be









As defined earlier, the average node degree of each node is d and q is
the quorum size of the underlying q-node quorum pinging scheme. Hence, we
can evaluate the effective node degree of each node, deff as follows:
deff = d − nA + 1 (4.2)
Note that in Eq. 4.2, the dependency of each node index is implicitly
reflected on the actual value of d. However, as we are here concerned about
achieving an average sense of the behavior under this scenario, we ignore the
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node level dependency. Later on when needed, we will discuss per node anal-
ysis.
Obviously the relative values of q and deff of the target node dictate
the success event for the adversary’s agents. If q > deff , then the adversary
is successful in capturing the target node with probability 1, which in turn
implies that the number of agents that capture successfully is maximized and
equals the total number of agents that are initially engaged in the attack.
However, if q  deff , then the adversary is unsuccessful with probability 1.
Similarly, for the multiple agent case under this condition, all the participated
agents will have failed in capturing their corresponding targets. This leads to
a minimum number of captured targets, which in this case is 0.
4.1.2 Countermeasures on Capture Strategy for Spe-
cific Targets
Therefore, as a defense mechanism against an envisioned total number of ad-
versary’s agents, NA that the network might encounter, we have to maximize
the average node degree, d such that q  deff holds in order to be able to
counter the maximum probability of success for capturing specific target nodes
by an adversary’s agents.
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4.2 Optimal Capture Strategy
4.2.1 Modeling of Optimal Capture Strategy
In this case, an adversary’s objective is to maximize the expected number of
agents that succeed in capturing nodes, given the total number of deployed
agents is NA.
Here, AS denotes the number of agents that succeed in capturing their
corresponding target nodes. So we can write the objective cost function as
follows:
maxE[AS ] (4.3)
In order to evaluate this cost function, we have to simplify it as much
as possible. To do so, we first expand the expected value of AS.
E[AS] = [p(AS = 0) ∗ 0] + [p(AS = 1) ∗ 1] + [p(AS = 2) ∗ 2] + [p(AS = 3) ∗ 3] + ...
... + [p(AS = i) ∗ i] + ... + [p(AS = NA) ∗ NA]
(4.4)
In Eq. 4.4, we see that for i 6= 0 the term p(AS = i) is proportional to
[P
(q)
m ]i. This comes from the fact that the event where AS = i corresponds to i
successful capture events performed by i agents independently, each having a
probability P
(q)
m . This implies that for practical values of P
(q)
m , [p(AS = i) ∗ i]
goes to zero rapidly for i ≥ 2. Thus, Eq. 4.4 can be rewritten as:
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E[AS] ≈ p(AS = 1) (4.5)
Substituting Eq. 4.5 into the cost function of Eq. 4.3 results in the
following optimization problem:
maxE[AS ] ≈ max[p(AS = 1)] (4.6)
Now we need to find p(AS = 1) in Eq. 4.6 in order to be able to get
the optimal capture strategy. p(AS = 1) means the probability of the event in
which just one out of NA adversary agents becomes successful in its capture
process. This agent can be any one of the NA deployed agents and the rest of
them should necessarily be unsuccessful. Fig. 4.1 depicts a fraction of the net-
work with 4 agents targeting different nodes of the network. Red links denote




























m as the probability of a missed detection for the
jth adversary’s agent as follows, we plan to evaluate p(AS = 1) in terms of the
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(4.7)
in which djeff denotes the effective node degree of the node targeted by
the jth agent. p(AS = 1) can be written as the union of all possible choices of
a success event for one of the agents and unsuccess events for the remaining
agents. This can be evaluated as follows:
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To elaborate on the behavior of p(AS = 1) with respect to its parame-
ters, we try to find the dominant terms in Eq. 4.8 and simplify the evaluation




m  1, we can approximate Eq. 4.8 as follows:
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of djeff over its feasible range. The result is shown in Fig. 4.2 which, in turn,




m with respect to d
j
eff ,
which means that the dominant terms in the summation in Eq. 4.9 correspond
to the ones with the lowest djeff . This observation leads us to the following
conclusion:
Lemma 2 Maximizer to Eq.4.6 is equal to the minimum effective node degree
djeff . In other words, the maximum is achieved when the adversary agent tar-
gets the node with the minimum effective node degree. This can be formulated
as follows:
arg {maxE[AS ]} = min(d
j
eff ) 1 ≤ j ≤ NA (4.10)
Remark 8 Note that in our argument in this case, we deliberately drop the
dependency of the effective node degree djeff to each node index for the sake of
notational simplification. It is quite clear that each node can have a different
node degree d individually in Eq. 4.2 and consequently, the resulting effective
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node degree deff would also be dependent on each individual node index. The
unbalanced node degree among nodes can occur due to a variety of reasons
ranging from the earlier capture of a neighbor of a particular node, to some
dead neighbors of a particular node due to battery depletion, malfunction, etc.
Lemma 2 leads to the optimal capture strategy for the adversary’s
agents in a way that the adversary distributes its agents to the potential
target nodes with the lowest effective node degree, i.e., lowest deff , and to
their surrounding nodes simultaneously. Those nodes with the lowest effective
node degree constitute the optimal targets for capture and their surrounding
nodes collaborate in the capture process of optimal targets to increase their
probability of success. The primary objective of the agents that are deployed
in the neighborhood of the main target is to help the capture of the main
target, though each of these collaborative agents can have their own chances
of success in capture of their direct targets with the corresponding probabili-
ties. Needless to say that these probabilities would be much smaller than the
ones for the main targets due to the fact that for the latter the probability is
boosted by the support of additional agents in the neighborhood while in the
former case, the agents are left alone in capturing their prospective targets. In
the next step, agents proceed sequentially to target other nodes based on the
immediate lowest value of deff and continue to follow this procedure for the
current target with lowest deff at a time. At each step of capturing a main
target node, at least 1 agent is deployed on the main target and a few agents
are needed per each main target deployed as a batch in its neighborhood.
Therefore, this procedure continues until the adversary uses all its available
agents. We will discuss the required number of collaborative agents in details
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in the following paragraphs.
Remark 9 The initial phase of deployment of an adversary’s agents can be
executed either based on the local knowledge of the node degree distribution d
or purely at random. Then for the successive deployment of agents, according
to Eq. 4.2, the adversary gets the lowest available effective node degree deff
in the neighborhood of the already deployed agents. This notion of collusion
among an adversary’s agents can be performed due to the fact that in the
q-node quorum pinging scheme, once an agent starts its capture process on a
target, the target is unable to interact with its immediate neighbors. Conse-
quently, the effective node degree deff of all the neighbors of the target under
capture will be affected and decremented by 1. This information can be trans-
ferred in advance to the rest of the agents prior to capture for the purpose of
exploring the lowest immediate effective node degree deff for the next agent
deployment. In this fashion, the already deployed agents gather and exchange
their information and try to help new agents to get better results.
Remark 10 The knowledge of node degree assumption provides a worst case
analysis of the model. As shown in Lemma 2, once the adversary knows the
node degree distribution of the network, it can target the node with the lowest
degree, which is the most vulnerable. In contrast, if the adversary does not
know this information, there is a possibility that it will target some nodes with
higher degrees, which in turn reduces the adversary’s probability of success.
Therefore, the availability of node degree distribution implies the worst case
analysis. Rest assured, if we design the system in a way that under such a
scenario the desired measures can be met, then for any other cases the system
definitely outperforms.
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To show the collaborative effect of a concentrated capture phase among
the targeted neighbors on capturing the main target with the lowest effective
node degree, we focus on the right-hand-side of Eq. 4.10. Minimizing deff
for any given node using Eq. 4.2 implies increasing the number of agents, nA
on its surroundings. To that effect, the adversary tries to distribute as many
additional collaborative agents as possible around the main target node with
lowest deff , in order to maximize the probability of success of capture, which
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m s.t. deff = d − nA + 1
(4.11)
Note that for a desired value of the probability of success for an adver-
sary in a node capture, it may not necessarily require using all its resources,
i.e., all its agents deployed for one target node. Rather, it might be suffi-
cient enough to meet the desired P
(q),(deff )
m by partially distributing some of
its agents for capturing the most immediate target, namely, the one with the
lowest deff and its surroundings, and reserve the remaining agents for captur-
ing the next immediate targets.
Comparing Eqs. 4.7 and 4.11, we realize that the two behave the same,
and consequently we can use Fig. 4.2 as a reference of the behavior of P
(q),(deff )
m
with respect to its parameter deff . So, we know that P
(q),(deff )
m is a convex func-
tion of deff and due to its exponential regime, f(a + b)  f(a) + f(b). This
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implies that, in terms of the probability of success for capture, the adversary
gains exponentially by concentrating its agents on the surrounding of a desired
main target, rather than scattering them sparsely across various targets. We
show this in the following example.
Suppose we have two distinct targets fairly far from each other in the
network. Each of them has a node degree of 15. The adversary has 6 agents
available in its hand for deployment. One strategy for the adversary is to try
to capture just one of its targets. To do so, it deploys one of its agents on
the main target and the remaining 5 agents on the target’s neighbors. In this
way the effective node degree of the main target would be deff = 15− 5 = 10.
The other adversary’s strategy is to capture both targets by deploying one
agent on each of them and the remaining 4 agents equally distributed on
their neighbors. Following this strategy, each main target ends up having the
effective node degree of deff = 15 − 2 = 13. Using the corresponding values
of P
(q),(deff )
m in terms of deff from Fig. 4.2, we find the expected value of the
number of successful agents as follows:
E[AS] = p(AS = 1) = 10
−3 for the first strategy (4.12)
while,
E[AS] = p(AS = 1) = 10
−6 + 10−6 = 2 ∗ 10−6 for the second strategy
(4.13)
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Obviously, the numerical results shown on Eqs. 4.12 and 4.13 justifies
the significant exponential gain for the adversary in distributing its agents as
concentrated as possible to its desired targets similar to the one discussed in
the first strategy of the above example. However, we have to point out that
once the desired adversary’s objective in terms of probability of success is met,
it is unnecessary to overinvest and deploy extra agents in the main target’s
neighborhood. It would be wise to save the remaining agents to capture the
next immediate targets.
Based on the detailed analysis of the optimal capture strategy presented
in this section, Table 4.1 summarizes the required steps as to how and in what
order the adversary needs to distribute its agents on the network nodes in
order to capture them.
Desired probability of success P
(q),(deff )
m for an adversary is given.
Maximum available number of adversary’s agents is NA.
Distribution of node degree d among nodes is imposed by network topology.
Adversary agent targets a node with the lowest deff to capture.
Simultaneously a batch of agents accompany that agent in its neighborhood.
The size of the batch depends on the improvement factor of P
(q),(deff )
m .
For successive capture, another agent targets a node with the next lowest deff .
This procedure continues sequentially till all agents are used.
Table 4.1: Summary of optimal capture strategy procedure
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4.2.2 Countermeasures on Optimal Capture Strategy
Again as a defense mechanism against the maximum envisioned number of an
adversary’s agents, the designer needs to push the effective node degree deff
of network nodes higher. This should be done primarily for those node with
a lower deff because they are more vulnerable to successful capture by an ad-
versary’s agents and for the same reason are subject to initial capture through
an optimal strategy. However, such nodes may not be identifiable a priori
and as a result we need to boost the average node degree across the network.
Therefore, to counter against the adversary, the designer has to increase the
average node degree d of the network, such that for the worst case scenario
for which a node may encounter the lowest node degree and highest number
of adversary’s agents deployed in its neighborhood, the underling q-node quo-
rum pinging scheme will still be able to meet the desired performance metric,
namely the maximum tolerable probability of a missed detection P
(q),(deff )
m , or




Conclusions and Future Research
5.1 Summary of Main Contributions
A common threat in many networks is the capture of network devices by an
adversary. Stajano’s big stick principle, which states that whoever has physical
control of a device is allowed to take it over, suggests that such an adversary is
more powerful than the Dolev-Yao and traditional Byzantine adversaries, and
hence difficult to counter. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), mesh networks,
and embedded networks pose unique security challenges due to the fact that
their nodes operate in an unattended manner in potentially hostile environ-
ments. A particularly difficult problem not addressed to date is the handling
of node capture by an adversary. In this work we addressed these security
challenges in WSNs due to the captured node problem. A key goal here is
to limit the damage caused by captured nodes. This is important since node
capture cannot be prevented. Hence, the presence of the adversary within a
WSN must be detected, and of course, the earlier the better. We identified the
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shortcomings of proposed methodologies dealing with the captured nodes and
defined the minimum requirements of a desired design. Adversary detection
is predicated on the fact that access to a captured node’s internal state incurs
a nonzero time delay. Our treatment for adversary detection is focused on
the in-capture detection phase, namely detection before the adversary gets a
chance to access a node’s internal state and do any network damage.
In in-capture detection phase, we proposed two probabilistic schemes
called the pairwise pinging scheme and quorum pinging scheme, whereby the
network continuously monitors itself in a distributed and self-organizing man-
ner. The intuition behind our approach is based on the prohibitive cost bur-
den of continuous monitoring, whereas by invoking random monitoring in local
neighborhoods we can attain a trade-off between cost and risk of node cap-
ture. We investigated the trade-offs between the network cost-performance
and security of this scheme via a Markov Chain model, and presented analyti-
cal solutions for both cases which allow us to choose appropriate performance
parameters, such as the expected residual time-to-false-alarm and probability
of false alarm, and security, such as the probability of a missed detection. The
quorum scheme is a generalization of the pairwise scheme by invoking at least
q neighbors of any target node to reach to a consensus regarding the status of
the target node. This scheme introduces a novel emergent property by which
performance of the proposed detection mechanism is improved exponentially
in exchange of linear cost increase in terms of quorum size q. A full version of
this work is to appear in [47].
Later on, we investigated optimal strategies for deploying multiple ad-
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versary agents in order to capture multiple target nodes. These strategies in-
clude which target nodes to pick, in what order they should be captured, and
what pattern the distribution of adversary agents should be (e.g., sequential,
random, simultaneously). The objective of the capture strategy is to maximize
the number of successful node capture through adversary agents using fixed
number of agents. We showed that using collusion among adversary agents
can significantly improve their chances in capturing their targets determined
by the optimal capture strategy. Finally, we evaluated that agent collusion
yields better capture results than independent, random capture. We analyzed
our model and characterized the necessary countermeasures against the opti-
mal capture strategy used by adversary to deploy its agents. The results show
significant resiliency of the underlying quorum pinging scheme to detect node
capture despite collusion among adversary agents.
5.2 Directions for Future Research and Pro-
jected Applications
In this work we assumed that agents preside over their corresponding targets
after their initial engagements. We would like to extend this scenario to the
case that agents can hop around different target nodes after completion of their
capture. Doing so, we can introduce the notion of rate of node capture over
time and assess that metric as a measure of effectiveness for various capture
strategies. A more generalized scenario to consider is the one in which both
network nodes and adversary agents in real time can be inserted with certain
rates to the network. In such highly dynamic cases, evaluation of node capture
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should be merely judged based on rate of node capture.
Potential applications for our proposed detection mechanisms rely on
the core assumptions of our scheme, i.e., dense network with unattended nodes.
A relatively broad range of applications can fit into this class. To name a few
more interesting cases, we can mention applications such as smart home se-
curity in urban area, structural health monitoring of pipeline, electrical grid
networks, and automated surveillance system.
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